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Abstract
We have a problem understanding our normative reasons. If there’s a
reason to φ, we can explain why that reason counts in favor of doing it with
the fact that φ-ing would be good in some way. But it’s also explainable
by non-evaluative properties that make φ-ing good. Suppose the traffic gives
us a reason to leave early for the airport. The deeper reason might be the
non-evaluative fact that the traffic would cause us to miss our flight, or it
might be the value of making the flight. Although both reasons are perfectly
good at the everyday level, it would be wrong to say they both contribute to
the fundamental normative story of why traffic favors leaving early. Because
both are ways of calling attention to the same idea, that making the flight is our
goal, they shouldn’t be independent. One of these considerations is a reason
only because the other is. If we considered each as its own self-contained reason
we’d be double-counting. So which is the more fundamental one? I argue that
values—goodness and badness of various kinds—give our best, most ultimate
reasons.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Reasons and wisdom
There’s an old idea in philosophy that the practically wise do things for
the right reasons. When I do something for the wrong reason—say, feeding
my neighbor’s pet turtles while he’s away so that they live long enough to
participate in the radiation testing I’m planning for them—I’ve exercised less
wisdom than I could have, even though feeding them was the right thing to do.
That much is commonplace. But philosophers tend not to notice the parallel
conclusion that wisdom also requires understanding what those reasons are and
where they come from. This is a dissertation about that overlooked virtue of
human rationality: knowing the normative source of our reasons.
To see why wisdom requires this, consider Holmes and Watson solving a
crime. Suppose they both conclude that the victim was poisoned, and do so on
the basis of just one reason, namely that there is a broken wine glass near the
body. But where Holmes understands that the glass provides a reason because
it must have slipped out of the victim’s hand as she was drinking, Watson has
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developed an unreflective superstition about broken wine glasses and poisoning
over the course of his work as a consulting detective and has no explanation of
his inference. Surely Holmes has shown more intellectual virtue than Watson,
and that’s despite the fact that they have both responded to the exactly the
same evidence. Or think of the religious believer who allows that the potential
for harming others is a moral reason not to text while driving, and thinks
that it’s a reason because God frowns on causing harm to others. When she
discovers the Euthyphro problem and realizes that God’s approval can’t be the
right explanation of our moral reasons, she gains in practical wisdom what she
has lost in suspect moral explanations. It should be clear from these examples
that this kind of practical wisdom differs from the classical Aristotelian kind.
Aristotle did not seem to require the wise to have a deeper understanding of
where their reasons come from.1 All the same, this other sort of wisdom is
worth having too.
This dissertation defends a straightforward but controversial view about
that kind of understanding: all of our reasons come from values. That is, our
best, most ultimate reasons are considerations of value. Suppose for example
that I face a choice between Job A and Job B, and that one reason for choosing
B over A is location. The view says that the final explanation for why location
considerations count in favor of B cannot rest with non-evaluative facts, like
the fact that A is in the Northeast and B is on the West Coast. It must lie
instead with something evaluative, like the fact that it would be better for me
to be on the West Coast, or the fact that the cost of living compared against
salary is no better at Job A than Job B. In other words, when there’s a reason
to do something, it has its normative force in virtue of some deeper reason
1See, e.g. Nicomachean Ethics, book 6.
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featuring values, good or bad. Knowing that makes us more like Holmes and
less like Watson.
1.2 The basic problem
If knowing where the reasons come from were easy, it wouldn’t be
philosophically interesting. There’s a simple difficulty in accounting for the
reasons we have. At first glance, both values and the qualities that make
things valuable appear to succeed as reasons of the same kind. So, if traffic
generates a reason to leave for the airport soon, that reason can be glossed
pretty well with the fact that we need to be there in an hour and the traffic
at this time of day usually makes it at least a 40 minute drive. But we can
also give the reason by noting that it would be bad for us if the traffic caused
us to miss the flight. We generally accept both kinds of considerations, value
and non-value, at least outside of philosophical contexts. These explanations
seem fine from the point of view of common sense, but trouble emerges when
we realize that every reason appealing to non-evaluative facts competes with
one involving evaluative facts, and vice versa.
For example, the fact that the ball landed next to the pin makes my golf
shot a good one, but if I’m listing out the reasons I have for being happy
with it, there’d be something odd about mentioning both its goodness and its
proximity to the hole. Both considerations are ways of praising the result of
the shot, so neither adds anything over the other. And the fact that I need
to write a dissertation to get a job makes it good for me to write this from a
professional standpoint, but its being necessary for a job and its being good
for my career don’t contribute to my reasons separately. These considerations
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say effectively the same thing, so we risk double-counting if we allow both as
independent reasons.
When this kind of competition arises, we’re forced to make one of the
reasons dependent on the other. Otherwise those of us who believe in
normative reasons are playing right into the hands of skeptics and nihilists.
We’re talking about a kind of power after all, namely the ability that features of
the world have to make it so that we should do and believe things. That’s what
normative reasons are about. Letting both values and makers give independent
reasons in cases like this would be redundant and would multiply powers
unnecessarily, which violates well-founded norms of theoretical simplicity. If
that were the settled picture of reasons philosophy had to offer, they would
look pretty suspicious.
So, we have a real question: are value facts the deeper reasons that
underwrite the everyday reasons given by non-value facts, or is it the other
way around? I don’t think there is any antecedently obvious answer to this
question. And because we go through life treating both as though they gave
perfectly good reasons on their own, common sense looks unable to offer any
clear guidance. Initial difficulties aside, though, I think the philosophical
evidence ultimately supports values as giving the best and most ultimate
reasons. That’s what it means to say that reasons come from values. I’ll
try to show that in the chapters that follow.
1.3 Summary of what’s ahead
The thought that reasons come from values is unpopular these days. The
dominant view is that reasons come only from value-making properties,
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made popular by T. M. Scanlon’s buck-passing view of value. Folks who
have recently defended versions of this idea include Derek Parfit, Jonathan
Dancy, Mark Schroeder, and Jonas Olson, with historical antecedents in Franz
Brentano, Henry Sidgwick, and A.C. Ewing. I’ll give two arguments to the
effect that this popular way of looking at things is wrong. But first we need
some background.
Chapter 2 lays the dialectical foundation. We’ll go into a bit more detail
about the phenomenon of normative reasons and our basic problem accounting
for them. The chapter also surveys the answers we can give to the problem,
tracing out some of their history. I’ll argue in particular that the view that
reasons come from values has roots not only in the eudaimonistic outlooks
of Plato and Aristotle, but in G.E. Moore as well. We’ll also have a look
at where the contemporary buck-passing tradition goes wrong, and why the
famous Wrong Kind of Reasons problem for that view shouldn’t trouble us
here.
Chapter 3 delivers the positive argument for the idea that reasons come
from values. The argument gets off the ground by combining two plausible
and widely accepted principles: the maxim that ought implies can and the
view that people are motivated only under the guise of the good. When you
have a reason to do something, you rationally ought to do it, at least prima
facie. If this obligation implies that the reason is something you can act on,
and it’s also true that we can be motivated only to the extent that we see
some kind of value in what we’re doing, then it follows that every normative
reason ultimately comes from value. If there were a reason that wasn’t in
the end dependent on value, it would be unable to motivate and so it would
violate Ought Implies Can. There are, of course, well-known objections to
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both of these premises, but I’ll argue that they can be weakened enough to
avoid them while still implying that reasons come from values.
I’ll suggest that we should accept some version or other of Ought Implies
Can, because without it ethics loses an essential feature: the ability to guide
our choices. If it weren’t always true that you can, in some sense, do the
things you should, then ethics stops being a discipline for real people’s lives.
At least one version of the principle is strong enough to work in the argument
while dodging a number of the major objections. Roughly, this version says
that nothing can be a reason unless it’s psychologically possible for the person
to be motivated by it. There’s also good evidence for the Guise of the Good
thesis. Most of the things we do we see some good in, even if we don’t think
very highly of them in the end. The primary complaints about the view
tend to focus on goodness per se as a motivator, and they can be handled by
modifying it so that we’re not only motivated by the good, but by other values
as well. These changes to the premises weaken the argument so that it can
avoid the common objections while still showing that values are the best and
most ultimate reasons there are.
Chapter 4 is about understanding the standard criticism of values giving
reasons, which is best represented by Scanlon’s redundancy argument. Because
the qualities that make things valuable are sufficient on their own to produce
the reasons we have—so the idea goes—values themselves are redundant
because there’s nothing left for them to do. All it takes is realization and
a presumption that apparent competition should be resolved in favor of the
lower level, and the higher-level realized things look useless. I’ll argue that
Scanlon has to be understood as making a particular kind of difference-making
claim, namely that if we subtracted all the value from the world while holding
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everything else fixed that we can, our reasons would remain unchanged.
Without this sort of premise, the conclusion that values don’t give reasons
doesn’t seem to follow. A survey of the alternative ideas bears out the need
for this kind of difference-making premise. We’ll call this the Principle of
Rational Exclusion, which is rather attractive despite being misguided.
Chapter 5 goes on the offensive against the redundancy argument and
criticisms like it, supplying the second argument against the idea that values
don’t give reasons. First we’ll build on the understanding of redundancy
as rational exclusion from Chapter 4 and address a few difficulties that
the Principle of Rational Exclusion (PORE) might create. Then we’ll turn
to the argument itself: if PORE, then values don’t give reasons, PORE;
therefore values don’t give reasons. Properly understood, both of its premises
are doubtful. On the one hand, you might think that the Principle of
Rational Exclusion shows us nothing about real-life reasons, since by making a
prediction about what would happen if descriptive-to-normative supervenience
were suspended, it’s given up on a fundamental feature of normative reasoning
and is therefore irrelevant. This counts against the if-then premise. On the
other hand, if we grant that PORE could show something about our actual
reasons, we risk it showing too much if we allow that it’s true.
I’ll show that the rationale behind PORE is structurally identical to
the causal exclusion argument that gripped the mental causation debates in
philosophy of mind during the 1980’s and 90’s. Once we see the similarities
between the two inferences, we open up the possibility of modifying responses
to the old causal exclusion argument into ways of resisting the new rational
exclusion argument. In particular, Ned Block’s rejoinder to causal exclusion
shows promise. Block argued that if we agree that the mental is excluded
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from having causal powers in favor of its non-mental realizers, then we must
also agree that higher-level realizers must be excluded in favor of the next
level down, and so on until the original causal powers we wanted to attribute
to the mental drain away to the lowest level of physics, if there even is one.
If there isn’t a lowest-level, then causal powers drain away into nothing. I’ll
make an analogous point about values and their makers: if we presume that
the makers are sufficient on their own to generate our reasons and exclude
values on that basis, then we must also exclude higher-level value-makers
in favor of lower-level ones, and so on until we reach the lowest level. Our
reasons would then be given by properties that are too basic and complex
for us to appreciate. If we can’t appreciate the properties that really give
our reasons then those reasons cannot be action-guiding, and therefore are
not really normative reasons at all. So if we go in for rational exclusion, the
reason-giving powers we ordinarily grant to macro-level properties will have
drained away into nothing.
Chapter 6 addresses an important objection from chapter 3 in significant
detail. Part of the positive argument for the view that reasons come from
values is the Ought Implies Can principle. Perhaps the most common worry
about Ought Implies Can is that it’s incompatible with the widely-accepted
thought that you can’t get an ought from an is, known as Hume’s Guillotine.
The problem is that if obligation implies ability, then inability implies a lack
of obligation. Since the claim that something can’t be done looks like a
straightforward is and the claim that it’s not the case that it ought to be
done looks like a straightforward ought, the two doctrines appear incompatible.
I’ll argue that despite its attractiveness, Hume’s Guillotine cannot withstand
scrutiny, and—fittingly—should be replaced with the Moorean view that there
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is no synonymy between normative and descriptive terms, which is no threat
to Ought Implies Can.
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Chapter 2
The Rational Competition
Problem
As I suggested in chapter 1, we have a problem explaining where our reasons
come from. On the one hand, the fact that something would be good to do
appears to furnish a complete and independent explanation of why I have a
reason to do it. And on the other, the very things that make it good to do
also appear to give a complete and independent explanation. So, since I enjoy
skiing, I have a reason to visit Utah for spring break. The fact that Utah
has good skiing constitutes one perfectly good normative explanation for my
reason to go there, one that doesn’t seem to depend on anything else. But
so does the low moisture content and high volume of the snow, which is what
makes Utah skiing so great.
For realists about reasons, this is a problem because allowing both to give
independent explanations is to needlessly multiply normative powers. Call
this the rational competition problem. If we’re going to take reasons seriously,
they need to be well-behaved. That is, a realist theory of normative reasons
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should be subject to the same constraints as other realist theories, which means
avoiding things like widespread overdetermination or double-counting.
This chapter sets the stage for the action to come. The aim of the
dissertation is to defend the idea that reasons come from values as a solution
to the rational competition problem. But there’s a lot contained within that
slogan. What are normative reasons and why should we be realists about
them? What kind of explanation of will a solution to the rational competition
problem give us? What are the possible solutions? This chapter answers
those questions, and addresses some skeptical concerns about the structure of
normative reasons.
2.1 What are reasons?
Normative reasons are considerations that count in favor of doing something:
taking an action or having a particular attitude. Here are some examples.
• That kale has health benefits counts in favor of eating it
• That kale tastes like dirt counts in favor of avoiding it
• That it would be good for me to finish my dissertation soon gives counts
in favor of writing right now
• That it’s my job to grade my students’ papers in a reasonable time counts
in favor of having them done by the end of spring break
• That positivity about the job market will make my life go better is a
reason for remaining optimistic
• That the schedule says the bus will be by my house at 9:27 counts in
favor of believing it
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• That I can’t cross the chasm and escape my pursuers without intending
to counts in favor of resolving to do it
Normative reasons offer an explanation of the things they favor by
justifying them. In other words, reasons explain in practical or rational terms
why those things would be worth doing. These contrast with motivating
reasons, which explain what led a person to do something. Here are a few
cases of those.
• I bought a new bicycle because I felt my old one was beyond repair
• I texted Idelle because I wanted to set a time to meet for dinner
• I listened to U2 because it was St. Patrick’s Day
• I believe there’s a rat in the attic because of the noises I heard
When we act well, our motivating reasons coincide with our normative
ones. But often they don’t. We can get a nice illustration of how they differ
by considering examples where I don’t act well—that is, where my motivation
conflicts with my normative reasons.
• I know that prudence requires me not to watch old episodes of “Teenage
Mutant Ninja Turtles” on the internet until late at night, but I enjoy it
too much to stop.
• I’ve promised to show up for a dissertation meeting at 9:30 this morning,
but I didn’t get much sleep last night and forgot, so I go out for breakfast
unaware that I should be on campus instead.
• I’ve recently learned that football teams who intentionally down the ball
by taking a knee win 80 percent of the time, and teams that do it twice
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win 95 percent of the time. I confuse correlation with causation and
conclude from this that I ought to direct the youth football team I coach
to take a knee in each of its first two possessions.
These show us that normative reasons are the good ones, and the motivating
are just the ones we use—good or bad. Motivating reasons will appear here
and there, but the normative ones are the main focus of the dissertation.
The idea that normative reasons are considerations that favor actions
or attitudes is called “the standard conception.” For the purposes of this
dissertation we’ll be assuming that something like the standard conception
is correct, though some might be skeptical. Those with misgivings about it
should pay special attention to the last section of this chapter, where I try to
address a range of concerns about the standard conception. For simplicity’s
sake I’ll refer to the actions and attitudes considerations count in favor of as
objects of reasons.
There is one thing worth saying about the standard conception here at the
beginning. Philosophers are surprisingly loose in the ways they talk about
reasons. The standard conception tells us that considerations give reasons,
and considerations are typically understood as facts or true propositions. But
when we’re adhering to the vocabulary of the standard conception, we quite
often talk about properties (or their instances) as giving reasons. I think we
should be happy to stick with this looseness, but it needs to be made clear what
these different locutions mean. Because normative reasons are explanations of
why we should do or think something, the things that give the reasons need
to have some kind of semantic content. Strictly speaking something like the
standard conception is therefore unavoidable—true propositions seem to be
what really count in favor of objects. Talk of properties giving reasons must
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therefore be shorthand for something having to do with propositions, and I
think we can capture it as follows. Properties (or property instances) give
reasons just insofar as names for those properties appear in true propositions
that count in favor.
This way of seeing properties as reason-giving has a noteworthy
consequence. Suppose F is a name for property p, and G is also a name
for p, and suppose further that <φ-ing would be F> is a reason to φ. This
means that p gives a reason to φ, insofar as it’s F . Because F = G, we
might be inclined to say that <φ-ing would be G> is also a reason to φ,
but that doesn’t follow. To be a reason is to be an explanation, and not all
co-referring terms have the same explanatory power, so P might give a reason
in virtue of being F but not G. This is all just a roundabout way of saying
that that semantic content matters in the business of giving reasons, and we
can’t substitute co-referring terms in reasons any way we like. This point will
become important later.
I said above that reasons need to be well-behaved if we’re going to be
realists about them. But we haven’t yet seen why we should want to be realists
at all. The reason is simple: any evidence someone might give against believing
in them would count as epistemic reasons, which are a kind normative reasons.
So we’re stuck with them, or at least anyone who cares about having support
for their claims is. You might not believe in all the kinds of reasons mentioned
in this dissertation—like moral ones—but just about everyone believes in
some, including error theorists like J.L. Mackie, who thought that the claims
of morality and evaluation were all false.1 Even he had to give reasons for
thinking that.
1See Mackie 1977.
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Now, this last move might seem a bit quick. Sharon Street calls herself
an anti-realist, not only about moral normativity, but the epistemic kind
as well.2 So she may seem like an example of someone who believes in no
reasons whatsoever. It’s important to bear in mind, though, that there’s
more than one way to be an anti-realist. One is to deny that there are any
mind-independent truths about reasons, which is Street’s view. But a much
deeper kind is to deny that there are any truths about reasons at all—even
mind-dependent or deflationary ones—and it’s only this full-on nihilistic view
that’s being denied. The picture of reasons we’ll be working with in the rest
of the dissertation is compatible with very weak versions of truth-realism, like
Street’s constructivism. We needn’t be platonists to accept it, nor do we need
to be robust realists like Russ Shafer-Landau or David Enoch.3
2.2 Normative explanation for reasons
Solving the rational competition problem will tell us something important
about reasons. But what? On the one hand, we might get an answer to the
metaphysical question of what they are, or what they consist in. The standard
conception of reasons as facts counting in favor of objects makes a first pass
at this kind of explanation. Or we might get an answer to the question of
how we have epistemic access to our reasons, or to normative facts in general.
On the other hand, we can ask why it is that loose, everyday reasons have a
genuine claim on us—that is, what are the most fundamental reasons we can
give for doing something? Answering this question gives us what I’ll call a
normative explanation of reasons. That’s the focus of the dissertation. In the
2Street 2006 and 2011.
3Shafer-Landau 2003 and Enoch 2011.
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same way that the metaphysician might want to know what the end of the
story for material composition is (simples, say), we are looking for the end of
the rational story of why some object of a reason is favored.
Normative explanation of reasons appears to be of the same general kind
as what people want when they ask “why be moral?” or “why be rational?”
To see that it differs from the metaphysical or epistemic kinds, notice that
giving an answer about what reasons consist in or how we can know about
them won’t satisfy. Someone with these questions wants to know why they
should think morality or rationality have any force at all, or what the most
gripping reasons are. This is an old point, but it’s worth making again.
Normative explanation for reasons works much the same way. Solving the
rational competition problem will tell us which reasons are the most ultimate
and most gripping reasons are, but that says very little about the metaphysical
or epistemic questions.
Although our present concern is of the same kind as the “why be rational?”
question, the goal is not to convince the dedicated skeptic that there is real
normative stuff out there—some people just refuse to be gripped. But for
those who accept at least some kind of normativity (and just about everyone
should, as we’ve seen), the question of what its most basic form is can still
arise: given that reasons compete, which are the more fundamental? That’s
our focus.
Observe that as with the skeptic’s question, metaphysical and epistemic
answers won’t work. That reasons are considerations favoring objects says
nothing about what our best reasons are. And the fact that we can know
our reasons by knowing their realizers wouldn’t tell us either—open question
considerations should make both of these things clear. The normative
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explanation of reasons is its own concern, and it should have a normative
answer.
Why is this particular question worth resolving? Certainly not to win over
folks who disapprove of all this reasons-talk. Rather, it’s because we gain a
kind of practical wisdom in knowing where reasons come from. As we saw
in Chapter 1, rationality and intellectual virtue hold in higher esteem those
who truly understand at a deeper level why they should do what their reasons
demand. So to the extent that we want to know our world and what it tells us
about the choices we should make, the normative explanation of reasons has
a place.
This claim about the value of knowing where the reasons come from is
parallel to a line that Daniel Star has advocated. Even if non-philosophers are
able to identify and act on good reasons without simply getting lucky, there
is a deeper truth to be had in finding the ultimate reasons for doing what we
should. And this philosophical explanation is not a waste of time, it’s wisdom
worth having.4
2.3 Solutions to the problem
For every instance of value there are value-makers: properties in virtue of
which things are good (and bad). Importantly, values and their makers need
not be identical. Here are some examples.
• Values: being morally right, being a justified belief, being a funny joke,
being imprudent
• Value-makers: being conducive to happiness, being a belief caused in the
4See Star 2011.
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appropriate way, having a certain timing and delivery, being contrary to
my long-term interests
As we’ve seen, values give straightforward, everyday reasons, and so do
value-makers. At the everyday level, the low moisture content of Utah snow
really is a reason to ski there, and it seems to provide just as complete an
explanation of why we should ski there as the fact that it’s good snow. Its
being good doesn’t add anything to the story. On the converse, once we
explain that it’s good, its good-making qualities don’t add anything. Either
would would be a complete snow-related reason on its own, and admitting
both as independent reasons would lead to the familiar double-counting and
overdetermination problems. The same goes for epistemic reasons. When the
sudden dimming of the sky counts in favor of believing it will rain, it could be
because dark clouds are good evidence for expecting rain or because they’re
strongly correlated with rain, and the same competition arises.
To be clear, the rational competition problem is not about which
considerations are reasons at the everyday level. Both kinds are. But only
one will provide the independent reasons, that is, the ones in virtue of which
the other, related considerations get to be reasons. The problem is about
choosing which group to privilege in the order of explanation.
Short of denying there’s a problem in the first place, there are three possible
responses. We could resolve the competition in favor of value-makers, in favor
of values, or deny that there is a single, unified explanation of our reasons. I’ll
discuss all three in this section. The aim will be to give some background for
each and to consider some objections.
Although each of the answers to the problem has some basis in well-known
philosophical views, none of those views had anything like the rational
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competition problem as their explicit target. They were meant to address
other questions, which I’ll try to distinguish in the discussion below. So it’s
not that people like Aristotle, Moore, or even Scanlon had exactly the same
concerns in mind, it’s that their ideas on similar issues surrounding normativity
and reasons present a framework for understanding the ways of answering the
problem before us.
2.3.1 Solution 1: value-makers
Consider first the idea that value-making properties, like the moisture content
of Utah snow, give the best and most fundamental reasons. This view is a
close cousin of what’s known as Scanlon’s buck-passing account of values and
reasons. Here’s Scanlon:
What, then, are the relations between these natural [value-making]
properties, the property of being valuable, and the reasons that we
have for behaving in certain ways in regard to things that are valuable?
There seem to be two possibilities. The first is that when something has
the right natural properties it has the further property of being valuable,
and that property gives us reason to behave or react in certain ways with
regard to it. Moore seems to be taking this view about goodness when
he says that it is a simple, unanalyzable, non-natural property. The
alternative, which I believe to be correct, is to hold that being good,
or valuable, is not a property that itself provides a reason to respond
to a thing in certain ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is to have
other properties that constitute such reasons ... It differs from the first
alternative simply in holding that it is not goodness or value itself that
provides reasons but rather other properties that do so. For this reason
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I call it a buck-passing account.5
There are a few independent claims here, but focus for now on the one that
says the properties of being good and being valuable don’t give reasons, while
value-making properties do. Although Scanlon doesn’t engage in talk of
normative explanation or what the ultimate reasons are, he clearly rejects
the view that reasons come from goodness and other values, since he thinks
they don’t give reasons at all.
To get from the buck-passing view to the idea the that reasons come from
value-making properties, we need to impose some additional detail (which
Scanlon need not accept, but bear with me). For present purposes we are
supposing that there are levels of reasons, and we need to do this because
of the rational competition problem. If we don’t, we risk double-counting
our reasons. Once non-independent reasons have been divided into levels,
the lowest level will be the one where the best and most ultimate reasons
reside. Given that framework, Scanlon’s account would come out as the view
that value-making properties give these ultimate reasons, since they’re the
only properties that give reasons in the first place. And his argument against
goodness giving reasons suggests that he’s alive to the rational competition
problem:
First, when I consider particular cases it seems that these reasons
are provided by the natural properties that make a thing good
or valuable. So, for example, the fact that a resort is pleasant is
a reason to visit it or to recommend it to a friend, and the fact
that a discovery casts light on the causes of cancer is a reason to
applaud it and to support further research of that kind. These
5Scanlon 1998, p. 97
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natural properties provide a complete explanation of the reasons
we have for reacting in these ways to things that are good or
valuable. It is not clear what further work could be done by special
reason-providing properties of goodness and value, and even less
clear how these properties could provide reasons.6
It is of course open to Scanlon or any other buck-passer to deny that
this argument appeals to competition (they might, for instance, think that
goodness doesn’t even appear to give reasons), or to accept the rational
competition problem but deny that invoking levels of reasons is necessary.
That’s why the view that value-making properties supply the ultimate reasons
is just a close cousin of buck-passing. But there’s some reason to think many
buck-passers would endorse this view, and Scanlon is certainly the inspiration
for it. For the most part, I’ll talk as if this just is Scanlon’s view, keeping in
mind the above caveats.
Now, the buck-passing account has two components. There’s a negative
thesis that says goodness never gives reasons while good-making properties do,
and a positive one that analyzes goodness in terms of reasons—to wit, that
goodness is the higher-order property of there being other non-value properties
that do give reasons. To generate the idea that value-makers give the ultimate
reasons from the previous paragraph, we only needed the negative thesis.
The negative thesis tells us that reasons are given exclusively by value
making properties. On the view I’ll defend here, values give reasons at both
the ordinary and ultimate level. But in light of the examples of values we
saw above, this dispute could look merely verbal. I’m inclined to call the
property of being funny a value, but it’s open to a buck-passer to call that a
6Scanlon 1998, p. 97
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good-making property rather than a value itself. In that case, the only thing
we would disagree about is whether to call it a value, making it a merely verbal
dispute. We’d agree on all the normative questions as far as being funny goes.
Indeed, it might look like this is the case given Scanlon’s claim that the
values of rightness and wrongness not only give reasons, but very powerful
reasons. Here’s Scanlon again:
The fact that an action would be wrong constitutes sufficient reason
not to do it (almost?) no matter what other considerations there
might be in its favor. If there are circumstances in which an agent
could have sufficient reason to do something that he or she knew
to be wrong, these are at best very rare. But if right and wrong
always or even almost always take precedence over other values,
this is something that requires explanation. How can it make sense,
if we recognize values other than right and wrong and take them
seriously, to claim that reasons of this one kind have priority over
all the rest? I will refer to this as the problem of the priority of
right and wrong over other values.7
This makes it seem like Scanlon thinks only that goodness per se fails to
give reasons, while other considerations featuring different names for values
do. This suggestion is confirmed by Scanlon’s later claim that “more specific
evaluative properties” often do give reasons.8 If that’s what Scanlon’s view
amounts to, there would be something to disagree about, but it wouldn’t be
much: one view says the fact φ-ing would be morally good (etc.) can be a
consideration that favors doing it, and the other doesn’t. That would be about
it.
71998, p. 148.
8Scanlon 2002, p. 513.
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Yet in spite of appearances and Scanlon’s way of putting things, I don’t
think this is the best way to understand the buck-passing account. For one
thing, it’s not clear that it will survive his own argument against goodness
giving reasons, which we saw above. If the properties that make things valuable
are sufficient on their own to generate reasons, then given that rightness
and wrongness are values, whatever properties make things right and wrong
should also be sufficient on their own. Thus there would be no work left
for rightness and wrongness to do. Jonathan Dancy runs this argument the
other way: if wrongness does give reasons over and above the ones given by
wrong-making properties, then it seems like badness should too.9 Either way
we look at it, we are led to the conclusion that buck-passers shouldn’t allow
values of any kind to give reasons. And if those arguments weren’t enough,
S. Matthew Liao adds that if we think of the view as only barring “thin”
evaluative properties like goodness from giving reasons, we lose one of the chief
attractions of buck-passing, namely its ability to give a non-circular reduction
of the evaluative realm.10 Goodness would simply be reduced to other values
on this version of Scanlon.
The appearance of a verbal dispute is likely due to the fact that values
often have multiple names, and sometimes those names don’t include the words
‘good’ or ‘bad’. Thus we call jokes “funny” instead of “comedically good,” and
beliefs “justified” rather than “epistemically good.” But we needn’t conclude
that being funny and being comedically good aren’t the same thing. They are.
So the buck-passer shouldn’t call the property of being funny a value-maker.
It seems to be a genuine value, because it’s the metric by which we evaluate
jokes. That can go a long way towards preventing the appearance of a verbal
9Dancy 2000.
10Liao 2010, pp. 427-431.
24
dispute.
David Chalmers has a test for verbal disputes. The test goes like this: we
forbid any use of the term that’s suspected of being the culprit and see if we can
state the disagreement without it.11 Now suppose the buck-passer continues to
say that the property of being funny gives reasons. One natural way to explain
the disagreement in that case would be to say that whereas my view takes that
property to give reasons in virtue of being a value, the buck-passer would think
it favors in virtue of something else, like a value-making property. But if we
want to apply the Chalmers elimination test, that can’t be it. If we’re barred
from using the word ‘value’, can we still find something to disagree over?
I think we can. Scanlon’s primary rationale for the buck-passing view is
the redundancy argument from above: since value-making properties would be
sufficient on their own to give all the reasons we have, we should say that they
really do give all the reasons, and value properties don’t. Take the value-talk
out of this and you get the schema that when the X would have been sufficient
on its own to generate all the reasons we attribute to Y then the X give those
reasons and the Y don’t. That’s a claim that people who think reasons come
from values ought to be wary of, since it would require taking a stand on
what things would be like at worlds where there were values without any
value-making properties. Such worlds might not have any people or rational
beings in them at all, so they may not have reasons either. What’s more,
I’ll argue in chapter 5 that buying into this schema threatens to create a
regress in which reasons drain away into unappreciable levels of ontology. So
it appears there is something to disagree about that doesn’t turn on uses of
value-terminology. And it should be evident that it’s at the center of the
11Chalmers 2011.
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dispute. Indeed, I’ll argue in chapter 4 that this claim of sufficiency and
exclusion the only plausible way to understand Scanlon’s argument.
Most of what I have to say about the buck-passing view focuses on the
negative thesis. But the positive one (that goodness is a higher-order property)
deserves some attention too, even if only to show why it’s not more central
to the dissertation. Philosophers seem to agree that the idea of analyzing
goodness in terms of reasons has its source in Franz Brentano, who hoped
to make human psychology and phenomenology the conceptual center of
philosophy, ethics included. He writes,
whoever loves and hates rightly, has his feelings adequately related
to the object, i.e. the relation is appropriate, suitable, [and]
corresponds suitably…12
This is the first expression of the fitting attitude theory of value. This view
seeks to define or analyze value concepts in terms of a relation between ideal
attitudes and the things that have value. In Brentano’s version, to be good is to
be worthy of love, and to be bad is to be worthy of hate. The view thus offers a
conceptual analysis of values in terms of fittingness (or correctness, worthiness,
etc.). Because fittingness seems to imply the existence of normative reasons
to do the fitting thing, we appear to have an analysis in which goodness
is defined in terms that are closely connected to reasons. Later versions of
the fitting attitude approach from Henry Sidgwick,13 A.C. Ewing,14 Elizabeth
Anderson,15 and Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson16 have added detail and
sophistication, but the core idea remains.
12Brentano 1889/1902, p. 70.
13Sidgwick 1907, pp. 110-111.
14Ewing 1948, ch. 5.
15Anderson 1993, p. 20.
16D’Arms and Jacobson 2000.
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Yet however the fitting attitude tradition might have influenced Scanlon
and the positive buck-passing thesis, it’s far from obvious that they come
to the same thing. This is because it’s not clear whether fittingness is a
value. One natural way to think about values is as ends—they’re the aims
of the various spheres of reasoning. In the realm of epistemic reasons, the
goal is to believe well. For moral and practical reasons, it’s to act rightly,
well, or at least prudently. In aesthetics we aim to create beauty of some
kind, in etiquette we want to be courteous, and so on for other kinds of
reasoning. Fittingness lends itself nicely to this way of thinking: it’s the end of
practical reasoning in general, or perhaps of reasoning all-things-considered.
If that’s right, fittingness would be a kind of general value of which other,
more familiar values are the species. We needn’t take a stand on whether
fittingness is a value, but there’s a plausible case that it is, in which case
the fitting attitude analysis and the buck-passing view would diverge in an
important way. Whereas the buck-passer would account for goodness in terms
of non-value properties that give reasons, the fitting attitude theorist accounts
for it in terms of other value properties that give reasons.
None of this is to say that the fitting attitude analysis is inconsistent with
buck-passing, but it might be consistent with other views too. And although
there would be something odd about accepting the positive buck-passing
thesis and thinking that values gave the best and most ultimate reasons,
nothing about the positive thesis directly implies that those reasons come
from value-makers either. As I’ll show in chapter 4, the failure of the negative
thesis undermines the case for the positive one, and that’s why it’s not the
primary focus of the dissertation.
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When we consider it as a whole, the buck-passing view looks attractive
for much the same reason as the the fitting attitude analysis, namely because
it offers a way to be a normative realist without the metaphysical excesses
of mooreanism or platonism. Both the fitting attitude and buck-passing
approaches tie goodness down to more concrete phenomena, namely attitudes
and familiar properties, which is certainly an improvement. But metaphysical
respectability isn’t the only thing we want in a normative theory. It’s also
important to get the normative story right: the fundamental reasons identified
by a theory should hold up to scrutiny too. Buck-passers (or at least those who
adopt the value-maker solution) try to align these two kinds of explanation by
having value-makers give both. And that can be a problem because normative
and metaphysical explanation aren’t the same thing.
To see this, consider a couple of examples that will feature prominently
in later chapters. First is the old statue-and-clay pair, Lumpl and Goliath.
The metaphysical story of Goliath the statue comes from Lumpl, the clay that
composes it. But if we had to choose one to be the source of the reasons we
have to, say, preserve the statue and put it on public display, Goliath seems to
provide the better story. We should preserve it because it’s Goliath—Lumpl
is incidental. Here the metaphysical story differs from the normative one.
Similar things are true of pain and the c-fiber firings it supervenes on (as
the convenient fiction goes). One natural metaphysical explanation of pain
is that it’s grounded in the action of the c-fibers. But if we had to choose
between the c-fibers and the pain state as the explanation of why we should
help the afflicted, the pain is the better one. What matters is that the person
is suffering, not that there’s activity in some area of the brain.
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These examples illustrate two things. One is the familiar point that
semantic content makes a difference in explanation, and the second is
that normative and metaphysical explanation come apart. Although the
buck-passer would be happy to accept the examples because neither explicitly
makes reference to values, that’s intended. All the cases are meant to show
is that we shouldn’t move from the fact that x is a metaphysical ground
for y to the claim that x gives more ultimate reasons than y. Buck-passers
might well be right that in some sense the value-making properties and their
relations are all we need to explain what reasons consist in. Unfortunately,
good metaphysics doesn’t always make good rational explanation—semantic
content matters a lot for the latter, and much less for the former. We’ll take
up this point again in chapters 4 and 5.
2.3.2 Solution 2: values
Next is the view I advocate, that values give the best and most fundamental
normative reasons we have. Call this the value-first view of reasons. I’ll start
by illustrating the view, then discuss some historical precedents for it, and
consider some basic objections.
Start with the level of ultimate reasons. Because normative reasons are a
kind of explanation, the view says that the best answer we can give for why
someone ought to do something is that it would be good in some way. So for
example, if I should shovel the snow from my driveway, the best explanation
will be something like the fact that it’s in my best interest to be able to get
the car out. Or if I should take the dog for a walk, the best explanation will
involve the benefit to her health. These examples cover the “best” half of our
“best and most fundamental” slogan.
29
This scheme of explanation isn’t limited to goodness of course. Badness
works the same way. Where the fact that it’s risky counts against investing all
my money in one company, this is because it’s imprudent to take that much
of a gamble. Dissonance between two notes might give me a reason not to
write them into the same song, and that reason comes from the fact that this
case of dissonance takes away from the song’s aesthetic value. Comparative
value facts work too. If B is a better option than A, that can explain why the
considerations favor choosing B.
That values both good and bad give ultimate reasons is compatible with
allowing non-value considerations to give looser, everyday reasons. The
view stops short of the claim that the only considerations that favor are
considerations of value. It would be a needless cost to suggest that everyday
claims about reasons are strictly false, like “the traffic is a reason to leave for
the airport earlier than usual.” This is an improvement over the buck-passing
view, since buck-passers appear to be committed to denying the truth of any
value-involving claims about reasons.
Thus we have explanations of why someone ought to do something that
are passable but not as good as the ultimate reasons. At this level there are
genuine reasons that appeal to value-making properties rather than values
themselves. Since those reasons shouldn’t be considered independent from the
ones given by the relevant values, they must be dependent on them. So if
the fact that the morning sky has suddenly gone dim gives me a reason to
believe it’s going to rain soon, that’s because the arrival of dark clouds is good
evidence for thinking it will rain. If the fact that giving money to Doctors
Without Borders will lead to the eradication of polio in Southeast Asia counts
in favor of my writing a check to them, its being a reason is explained by the
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moral goodness of doing so. Ordinary considerations get their normative pull
from values in this way—that’s what it means to say that reasons come from
values. These examples illustrate the “most fundamental” half of our slogan.
Some would conclude from the idea that values give the ultimate reasons
that non-value facts must give derivative reasons—that is, derivative on the
independent reasons values give. In one sense they are. They’re derivative by
not being the end of the explanation of why something is favored. But this is a
fairly weak kind of derivativeness, since they’re still closely related to ultimate
explanation by supervenience. This contrasts with a more objectionable way
a reason could be derivative: by being a mere place-holder for the genuine
thing. To borrow Mark Schroeder’s example, the fact that there’s a reason
to go into the living room is a reason to go, but it’s wholly derived from the
real reason, which is that your friends have planned a surprise party for you.17
Non-value facts we appeal to as reasons in ordinary contexts don’t depend on
values in this way, so the reasons they give won’t be derivative in the stronger
sense. That wraps up the basic statement of the view. Now we’ll turn to some
history.
The eudaimonistic outlooks of Plato and Aristotole square nicely with the
idea that values rather than value-makers give the ultimate reasons. Since
they thought wisdom requires aiming at the good life in all things, everything
we have reason to do will be for the sake of the good life. This comes out
especially in Aristotle. He argues in Book 1, chapter 5 of Nicomachean Ethics
(1095b15-1096a10) that people should choose subsidiary goods like pleasure,
honor, and weath because they are conducive of the good life, not because they
are what the good life actually is.18 And he says later in Book 1 (1097b15)
17Schroeder 2011.
18See a similar point in Kraut 2014.
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that the good is what makes things desirable or choiceworthy. These passages
make a good case that Aristotle thought well-being was the fundamental
normative explanation, even if he didn’t employ the modern concept of a
reason. They also suggest that Aristotle did not succumb to the temptation to
align normative explanation with metaphysical explanation, as Plato and the
fitting-attitude/buck-passing theorists seem to do. Whatever the metaphysical
story for the ultimate good turns out to be—for Aristotle, this appears to
be the virtuous activity of the soul (see 1097b-1098a20)—it won’t be the
normative one, since it’s not the thing in virtue of which we ought to do
everything else.
Because of Aristotle’s place as the figurehead of the modern virtue ethics
tradition, some may want to resist associating him with the idea that reasons
come from values, since the modern virtue approach is often presented as an
alternative to ethical approaches that focus on goodness or rightness, namely
consequentialism and deontological views. We’ll address the value-first view’s
similarities with consequentialism further on, but we can start to make it
more palatable for modern-day virtue theorists by highlighting what makes
virtue ethics an interesting methodological alternative to consequentialism and
deontology: it dispenses with actions as the primary bearers of normative
properties. Insofar as it’s desirable to have virtues and dispositions at the
heart of normative theory, the value-first view can accommodate that. Virtues
are values too—values of character, intelligence, etc.—capable of generating
moral reasons, epistemic reasons, and so on.
The modern inspiration for the idea that values give the best reasons is
G.E. Moore’s consequentialism, and most philosophers these days treat him
as the ideal representative of the view. Moore famously claims in the Principia
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that goodness is the one and only property that makes things right, which is
evidence for thinking he would have called a consideration like <φ-ing would
be good> the best kind of moral reason to φ.19 Moore didn’t often make use
of the reasons-talk that we do now, but there are a couple of passages where
he mentions them. The first is from Principia.
The only reason I can have for aiming at ‘my own good’ is that it
is good absolutely that what I so call should belong to me...But if
it is good absolutely that I should have it, then everyone else has
as much reason for aiming at my having it, as I have myself.20
And from 1942:
... the fact that an action, which I could do, would produce
some intrinsically good thing is always some reason (though far
from a conclusive one) in favor of the hypothesis that I ought
to do that action: or, in other words, that such a fact is always
favorably relevant to the hypothesis that I ought to do the action
in question.21
Taken together, these three statements make a strong case that (a) Moore
thought goodness always gives the best moral reasons, and (b) he had
something like the standard conception of a normative reason in mind. But
as it was with Scanlon above, we need more to get us from this view to the
idea that values give the best and most fundamental reasons, both for moral
reasons and other normative reasons alike.
To get us closer to the thesis we’re looking for, consider what Moore says
near the beginning of Principia, chapter 6:
191903, p. 18
201903, p. 150
211948, p. 565.
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... I regard it as indubitable that Prof. Sidgwick was so far right
... that such mere existence of what is beautiful has value, so small
as to be negligible, in comparison with that which attaches to the
consciousness of beauty. This simple truth may, indeed, be said to
be universally recognized. What has not been recognized is that it
is the ultimate and fundamental truth of Moral Philosophy. That it
is only for the sake of these things—in order that as much of them
as possible may at some time exist—that anyone can be justified
in performing any public or private duty; that they are the raison
d’être of virtue; that it is they—these complex wholes themselves,
and not any constituent or characteristic of them—that form the
rational ultimate end of human action and the sole criterion of
social progress: these appear to have been truths which have been
generally overlooked.22
The idea that consciousness of value forms the ultimate end of human actions
sounds much more like the target view. We already had the claim that values
give the best reasons, and now we have the claim that they are thing in virtue
of which all other things should be done. We do not, however, have any reason
to think Moore was motivated by the rational competition problem, that he
thought in terms of levels of reasons, or that he would have countenanced a
wide range of values (although he did of course think there are many different
things that are intrinsically valuable). So at the very least, what we have is a
very close cousin of the value-first view of reasons.
So far, locating Moore in the present debate might seem pretty
straightforward. But there’s an objection to the standard interpretation of
221903, pp. 237-8.
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Moore, claiming he never thought that goodness or other values give reasons.
Jonas Olson argues that Moore thought goodness was just the metaphysical
ground of rightness, and that reasons come only from natural properties. This
would be, in effect, the negative buck-passing thesis without the positive one.
The first premise of Olson’s argument that Moore didn’t think goodness
gives reasons is that they genuinely don’t. The second claims that Moore’s
early and later ethical views are consistent with this fact. This is a weak
argument even if we grant the premises, since it relies on the principle of
charity to go through, and charity alone isn’t much of a reason to believe Moore
thought this. Olson’s rationale for the first premise is Scanlon’s redundancy
argument, which we can set aside for now.23 We’ll consider its merits at
length further on in the dissertation, suffice it to say there’s good reason to be
suspicious. The second premise is more interesting for present purposes.
To show that Moore’s views are consistent with the idea that goodness
doesn’t give reasons, Olson separates the outlook of the Principia from the
one found in Ethics and later writings. His interpretation of the early Moore
is that when something has the right natural properties, it has the further
property of being good which “analytically implies” the existence of reasons,
but doesn’t give any.24 The argument for this interpretation seems to be that
there’s a difference between giving a reason and being the analysis of a reason.
So it’s consistent for Moore to say that natural properties give the reasons,
while analyzing those reasons in terms of goodness: x is a reason =df x is
productive of goodness, or something similar.
Similar things go for the later Moore. Olson suggests that Moore is
perfectly able to agree with the buck-passer that non-value properties give
23Olson 2006, pp. 526-527.
24Olson 2006, pp. 527-529.
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all the reasons. All Moore would saying is that there being a reason is
materially equivalent to there being goodness around.25 On this reading, the
only difference between the early and later Moore is that where the connection
between goodness and reasons is analytic in the Principia, it’s weakened to
mere necessary correlation later on.
Now, Olson is surely right that if Moore restricted himself to just these
views about the connection between goodness and reasons, he could also have
denied that goodness gives reasons. But we already have plenty of evidence
that he went a good deal further than that, all the way to thinking that values
(or at least consciousness thereof) gave the best reasons.
Olson acknowledges that the first two passages from Moore we saw
above—the ones that actually say goodness gives reasons—make it look like
that’s what he thought, but Olson urges us not to take them literally. Instead,
he suggests, talk of goodness giving or being a reason may just be short-hand
for saying that the natural properties goodness supervenes on give all the
reasons, and we can give this short-hand because any talk about goodness
implies that there are reasons around.26 This would be a plausible reading
of the passages only if there was independent textual evidence for thinking
Moore thought goodness didn’t give reasons, and Olson has none. In light of
that, the text we have speaks in favor of believing Moore did think of goodness
as a reason-giver, and also perhaps that he thought it gave the best and most
ultimate reasons.
So much for Olson’s objection to the standard interpretation of Moore. To
close out this section, we’ll look at some other common objections to Moore
that might be raised against the value-first view.
25Olson 2006, p. 529.
26Olson 2006 p. 528 and p. 530.
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Moore’s general outlook is now long out of fashion. There are a handful
of reasons for this, but fortunately the common objections to full-blooded
mooreanism need not confront the value-first view, which is substantially
weaker. The first group of these is against non-naturalism.
Mooreanism holds that goodness can’t be analyzed, i.e. that it’s a sui
generis and simple property with no proper parts. This can be troubling for
those who prefer a purely scientific view of the world, one free of irreducible
normativity. Contemporary metaethical naturalists with this mindset often
claim that the normative can be analyzed with identity: normative properties
like being good are a posteriori identical to non-normative scientific properties,
like being conducive to human cooperation and survival, etc. Although
Moore himself would not have accepted this, it’s entirely compatible with the
value-first view of reasons. The varying kinds of goodness and badness might
be identical to arrangements of non-normative properties, but give reasons
just in virtue of their being values. Although I’ll continue to refer to the
non-normative properties values supervene on as value-makers or realizers and
talk as if they’re not identical, this shouldn’t be taken to preclude identity
between them. Identity is just a special case of supervenience and realization.
That said, the view does require that only values give the ultimate reasons,
and some might worry that we can’t have it both ways if we’re identity
naturalists. Suppose that values give the best reasons and are identical to
arrangements of natural properties. Those arrangements would give the best
reasons too, right? Not exactly. As we saw earlier, it’s not the case that if x
gives reasons and x is identical to y, then y gives reasons too. Think of pain
and microphysical properties again: they might be identical, but if we can’t
understand the micro properties, then considerations featuring them cannot
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be reasons, because considerations must be appreciable in some sense in order
to be normative reasons. So contemporary non-naturalists should feel free
to adopt the view, remembering of course that non-value properties can give
everyday, non-ultimate reasons.
A second kind of objection focuses on epistemology. Moore’s intuitionism
has it that knowledge of moral facts is non-inferential and a priori. The view
that values explain reasons isn’t committed to anything as strong as that,
so the many of the usual objections to intuitionism—e.g. that there is no
such faculty of intuition, or that there’s no way to tell if our intuitions are
getting things right—can be safely put aside. But since the view is compatible
with non-naturalism about values, there might remain a worry about how such
abstract properties would be accessible if they’re not identical to more familiar
ones.
This point is structurally analogous to the Benacerraf Problem for
platonism about numbers. According to that objection, it’s hard to see
how we could know anything about numbers if they were real, abstract,
and mind-independent since they would have no causal connection to us.27
Although the problem is prima facie compelling and interesting in its own
right, there is an important difference between numbers and values that
should prevent it being a concern for non-naturalism about values. Whereas
platonic numbers aren’t realized by more ontologically basic properties, values
are. Because many of these value-making properties are easily accessible (like
someone’s experiencing pleasure, or the traffic’s causing us to miss our flight)
all we need is a belief that certain value-makers correlate with values, and we
have inferential access to them.
27See Benacerraf 1973.
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One might wonder why we need values to give reasons at all if their realizers
are epistemically sufficient for us to know about the normative world. But
just as we don’t want to confuse our epistemology with our metaphysics, we
don’t want to confuse it with our normative explanation either. Although
questions about justification are normative and thus part of the sphere of
reasons, this is a worry about access, not justification. So it’s really a
metaphysical question rather than a normative one, and we’ve already seen
that metaphysical explanation doesn’t tell us much about the normative.
The last group of objections to consider are against consequentialism,
and here we mix worries about Moore with more general concerns. Saying
that values give the ultimate reasons sounds very much like a version
of consequentialism. There are, of course, too many concerns about
consequentialism to address here. Yet many of these can be dealt with
by pointing out two ways in which the present view differs from classical
consequentialism (CC).
First, some versions of CC place the explanatory burden on special kinds
of values, in particular:
• Final values (things valuable for their own sake)
• Intrinsic values (things valuable just in virtue of their intrinsic
properties)
• Absolute or unqualified values
The value-first view of reasons doesn’t on its own require that any of these
be given special explanatory significance. It’s consistent with the idea that
values give the ultimate reasons to allow that all kinds of values—moral,
epistemic, prudential, aesthetic, instrumental, etc.—can be the end of rational
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explanation. Thus the view is also free from commitment to value monism,
unlike many versions of CC. That said, it is attractive to think that final values
do enjoy a kind of priority—while instrumental goodness does some genuine
explaining, the further down the chain we get from something valuable for its
own sake, the less ultimate it is.
Second, the value-first view differs from CC because it makes no claims
about weighting. That is, it need not be a maximizing view in the sense that
what’s most good gives the strongest reasons. The idea that reasons come
from values lends itself naturally to maximizing, but for present purposes
we’re just considering the singular claim that value properties form a class,
namely the class of things that give the best and most fundamental reasons.
This appears to be logically compatible with non-maximizing. Leaving this
question open has an additional benefit, which is that the view can allow for
rational supererogation: things might be better without giving us more reasons
to do them, and the attractiveness of supererogation could explain why.
So, is this consequentialism or not? Well, it’s certainly not utilitarianism or
mooreanism. And it’s consistent with a range of deontological views, because it
takes no stand on what the values actually are—remember, it’s just a theory
about the proper form of normative explanation. Properties like respecting
the rights of others or complying with the categorical imperative are plausibly
thought of as values too. We don’t need to see the view as consequentialist,
but to the extent that it is, it doesn’t seem especially objectionable. Many,
indeed most, moral views can be interpreted as kinds of consequentialism.28
One of the virtues of the idea that values give the ultimate reasons is that
28See Dreier 1993 for a defense of the idea that any moral view can be consequentialized,
and Brown 2011 for a proof that there will be a small number of views that escape
consequentialist assimilation.
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it represents a middle way in non-naturalist realism between the dominant
buck-passing tradition and mooreanism. It avoids the platonic excesses of
Moore, while staying clear of the excessive reductionism in buck-passing (more
on that in chapter 5) In the chapters that follow, I’ll try to argue that the
view is true and show that the primary motivation people have for denying
it—Scanlon’s redundancy argument—leads to serious trouble.
2.3.3 Solution 3: both
Finally, consider the idea that there is no unified solution to the rational
competition problem: some ultimate reasons are given by values, and others
by value-makers. It’s not clear whether anyone has held this view (although
both Jonathan Dancy and Roger Crisp have said things that sound like this).29
There are two ways of developing this thought.
On one version, we deny that there’s a unified solution, but we do so
for principled reasons. There would be rules for determining when a value
property is the source of a reason, and when the source is a value-making
property. This is fine as far as it goes, but it’s hard to see what those rules
might be. Since there are no attempts to state such rules as far as I know, we
can safely set this version of the view aside for now.
The other version does away with a unified solution, but offers no rules
for fixing when one or the other is the ultimate reason. Rather, specific and
potentially unique features of individual contexts determine what the most
basic reason is. This kind of view might be motivated by a desire to respect
the complexity and messiness of lived experience. That’s a noble aim, but this
29In separate places, Dancy has said that values don’t give reasons, and also that values
are the “ground” of reasons. See Dancy’s 2000, p. 164 for the first claim. See his 2002 for
the second. Crisp claims that goodness sometimes gives reasons, and sometimes it doesn’t,
in his 2008.
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version strikes me as a non-starter under present purposes. As we saw above,
one of the primary challenges for realism about normative reasons is to show
that they are well-behaved enough to be taken seriously. And since nearly
everyone should be a realist of some kind, rejecting simplicity and order in
favor of capturing the messiness of experience is to make realism much more
susceptible to the challenges of anti-realism and skepticism. If we can’t state
an orderly theory of reasons, then the whole idea of normative reasons begins
to look more like a story we tell ourselves and less like a genuine phenomenon
that there are facts about. I write this in full knowledge that the kind of person
tempted by this version of the view might think the order and simplicity of
a unified solution creates a much more serious threat of skepticism because it
alienates people from the reasons they have (as Bernard Williams or Michael
Stocker might say).30 I just disagree. In chapter 3 I’ll develop a view about
motivating reasons that enables us to keep the idea that people act well when
their motivating reasons coincide with their normative ones, while still allowing
that the thoughts that occur to us might not be as cold and calculated as
philosophers’ descriptions of those reasons often suggest. So at least some
worries about alienation can be handled without resorting to this view.
That’s all for the main portion of the chapter. If you have no qualms about
accepting the standard conception of a normative reason, feel free to skip
ahead to chapter 3. There are, however, philosophers who may be skeptical
that considerations counting in favor of actions or attitudes is the best way
to capture the phenomenon of reasons. These next few pages are for those
people.
30See Stocker 1973, and Williams 1973.
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2.4 Worries about the standard conception
The view that reasons are considerations counting in favor of actions or
attitudes is widely adopted, but it would be nice to have an explanation of
why it’s the standard, and why it’s safe to assume here as well. To close out
the chapter, I’ll address each component of the counting-in-favor relation as it
relates to the questions under discussion here.
2.4.1 Favoring
Why say that considerations count in favor rather than something else? The
standard answer is that favoring is conceptually equivalent to being a reason,
so we can’t do any better—they’re foundational concepts of the normative
realm and they can’t be explained any further. As Scanlon puts it,
I will take the idea of a reason as primitive. Any attempt to explain
what it is to be a reason for something seems to me to lead back to
same idea: a consideration that counts in favor of it. “Counts in
favor how?” one might ask. “By providing a reason for it” seems
to be the only answer.31
Derek Parfit says similar things in his recent book.32 For present purposes, I
think it’s safe to assume this view or something close to it. The concept of
counting in favor does appear to be pretty foundational. It’s worth mentioning
that there could be reasonable doubts about the idea that favoring and reasons
can’t be explained any further, though. If we want to know how something
counts in favor, “by providing a reason” doesn’t seem to be all we can say.
“By showing it’s worth doing” or “by explaining how it would be good” also
311998, p. 17.
32See the first chapter of his 2011.
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seem to be reasonably informative answers, but we’ll leave that question aside
here. This dissertation is about which things give our best reasons, not the
conceptual analysis of reasons. So nothing to come turns on whether the
standard conception is right about this.
2.4.2 Considerations
Now on to what the favoring relation relates. The standard conception says
that considerations favor, and the usual idea is that considerations are facts
or true propositions. Why facts or true propositions? This is best thought
of as a question about why considerations need to have a close connection to
truth and falsity, as facts and propositions do, rather than being things further
removed from truth: a desire for ice cream or the property of being worse than
the alternatives. One thought is that we want a near relation to truth because
we’re talking about genuine favoring—normative reasons are constrained by
the way things actually are. While this general thought seems right, doing it
justice doesn’t seem to require facts or propositions. So while truth might be
an easy way to get at the actual, things like properties, desires, etc. can also
deliver it. This leaves open the possibility that considerations involve more
than facts or propositions. As we noted earlier, ordinary language suggests
we’re comfortable with that. Think of all the times we say things like “the
market value of your house gives you a good reason to wait a few years to sell,”
or “the good that Oxfam does gives you a reason to donate.” There might be
reasonable ways to paraphrase this kind of talk away, but these attributions of
reasons are not obviously false. Moreover, since reasons stand for normative
powers, attributing those powers to something like propositions might play
back into the hands of skeptics, nihilists, and deflationists. Many deny that
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propositions exist, or are at least suspicious of them, and so any theory giving
them powers may look dubious.
The lesson to draw from all this is that the standard view of considerations
as facts or propositions is just a model. It does not settle any deep
metaphysical questions about what they are—like any model, it just needs
to approximate its target. The true propositions we assign as considerations
supervene on the less abstract alternatives I mentioned above (properties,
desires, etc.), so we can expect they’ll be close enough. From now on, I’ll
talk of considerations as facts, by which I mean they are true propositions.
I do this to follow established usage, and as we’ll see further on, there are
good reasons for sticking with this usage. Yet for present purposes we needn’t
take a stand on the metaphysics of considerations. The same goes for the
relation of counting in favor and what considerations count in favor of. We’ll
be concerned instead with the normative explanation of these things.
2.4.3 Actions and attitudes
The last element to ask about are the things that considerations count in
favor of. The standard conception says that these are actions or attitudes,
like driving a friend to the hospital or intending to walk the dog. Why these?
Scanlon answers that it’s because these are things we can intentionally do
and be responsible for—in Scanlon’s terms, they’re the things we’re open to
judgement for.33 That is, actions and attitudes are the focus of reasons because
they’re they only things that can be regulated by normativity. That we have
control in some sense over these and not other things is the explanation of
why they’re governed by norms. Notice that this answer to the question is
331998, pp. 21-22.
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effectively the same as the popular view that ought implies can. I’ll say more
about the Ought Implies Can principle in chapters 3 and 7.
I agree with the basics of Scanlon’s explanation, but the way it’s pitched
leaves it open to controversy. Those who reject the idea of moral or normative
responsibility will balk at his way of putting things. Yet Scanlon’s idea about
being open to judgement can help here. Although judgement sometimes
involves holding people responsible, it need not. It’s also a way of evaluating:
A did well, but B acted badly, and so on. And we can make these evaluative
assessments without holding that someone is deserving of praise or blame
in the way that incompatibilist moral responsibility requires. They are also
appropriate even if determinism is true.34 So the better explanation of why
actions and attitudes are what considerations favor is that those are the things
we can be appropriately evaluated for. Some attitudes are the right ones to
have, some beliefs are simply unjustified, and some actions are imprudent.
Evaluable actions and attitudes may not be the whole story of what reasons
count in favor of, though. Think of people with lots of bias. They might be
evaluable not just for questionable actions and attitudes, but also for failing to
do anything about their disposition towards them. And although actions and
attitudes are essential to any dispositions thereto, you might think that what’s
being evaluated with dispositions may be different such that the judgement
of actions and attitudes may not account on its own for what we think of the
related disposition. Take a person who forms a racist attitude but doesn’t
have the disposition to do so, and then think of a person who forms the very
same racist attitude and has a long-standing habit of doing so. It doesn’t look
unreasonable to think that the same reasons tell against the attitude that
34Here I am parroting a famous point from Gary Watson. See Watson 1996.
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these two people share, but judge that there are additional reasons against
having the disposition. This is tied to the virtue-theoretic idea that there are
moral evaluations of actions, but there are also moral evaluations of character
or people. Maybe there are reasons to instantiate properties too.
I think all of this is plausible, but for ease of presentation we’ll stick to
the standard idea of actions and attitudes as the objects of reasons in the rest
of the dissertation. If it turns out these other things should be added to our
model of reasons, then everything I have to say about the source of normative
reasons will hold for them too: if there are reasons for having dispositions or
properties, values give the best and most ultimate reasons for having them.
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Chapter 3
Ought Implies Can, Can
Implies Value
Like a lot of people, I believe in something in the neighborhood of the views
known as Ought Implies Can and the Guise of the Good. This chapter does
something ambitious with these ideas. Versions of them will be put to use as
premises in an argument that values give the best and most ultimate reasons we
have—that is, the value-first view of reasons. Both premises are controversial,
but I’ll argue that they can avoid common objections and still work to imply
the conclusion we need.
In broad strokes, the argument goes like this. If ought implies can, then
because normative reasons place us under prima facie obligations, the existence
of an ultimate reason implies that it’s possible to comply with it. That’s
because practical wisdom requires not only doing the proper thing, it requires
doing it for the right reason. If wisdom means doing thing x because of
consideration y, then truly complying with rationality means doing x because
of y. To do anything less would be to do things that we don’t fully understand.
48
And if the Guise of the Good is true, then the ultimate explanation of our
motives must be that we judge our actions to be worth doing—that is, valuable
in some way. The explanation of our motivations when we act well will
line up with our ultimate normative reasons, because that’s what practical
wisdom amounts to. Since the space of ultimate reasons is constrained by
what’s motivationally possible, and what’s motivationally possible is limited
to considerations of value, all the ultimate reasons are considerations of value.
Normative reasons contrast with motivating reasons, which are also central
to the argument. Motivating reasons involve a consideration and an object too.
But in the case of motivating reasons, the consideration explains an agent’s
motivation towards the object rather than favoring it. So when I’m moved
to stop writing my dissertation and go play some tennis, the explanation
might be that I felt it would be better to get some exercise and fresh air
than to stay inside all day. In that case there’s a consideration, <that
it would be better>, which explains my motivation towards the object of
playing some tennis. It’s helpful to describe motivating considerations in this
explanatory sense because there does not seem to be a clear folk theory of
motivation—people describe their motives as beliefs, desires, and emotions.
And while all of these states can take propositions as their intentional objects,
it might seem phenomenologically wrong to suggest that we are always act
with value propositions in mind.1 Describing motivating considerations as
explaining our motives rather than being them avoids this worry.
Motivating considerations also face a rational competition problem when
understood in this way. When I get up to play tennis, we can give a complete
explanation of my thinking in terms of value: <that it would be better for
1Some people think emotions aren’t propositional attitudes. We’ll leave that question
aside here, as it makes little difference to the argument of the chapter.
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my state of mind>. But we can also give a complete account in value-making
terms: <that it will reduce my stress hormone levels>. Counting these as
independent motivations would lead to a double-counting problem, just as we
saw with favoring considerations. And just before, the the best way to dissolve
the competition is to make one explanation more fundamental than the other.
Thus we have explanations of people’s motives that are more ultimate than
others.
Considerations are best thought of as facts or propositions, depending on
what role the consideration is playing. If a consideration is involved with a
normative reason then it will be a fact, understood as a true proposition. False
propositions don’t objectively favor anything. But when the consideration
is part of a motivating reason, it need not be true—we’re often motivated
by mistaken ideas. Thus a consideration of value is a proposition about
something’s having value. More specifically, a proposition is a consideration
of value just in case it’s a proposition to the effect that something satisfies a
value predicate, like ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘better’, ‘worse’, etc. So that’s why <that
it would be better to get outside> is a consideration of value.
Now that the main concepts are a bit more precise, here’s what the
argument looks like. Let’s interpret Ought Implies Can as saying that every
ultimate reason is a possible ultimate motivating consideration. And we’ll
take the Guise of the Good to say that every possible ultimate motivating
consideration is a consideration of value. Together, these premises imply
that every ultimate reason is a consideration of value. They bar non-value
considerations from being ultimate reasons because they don’t play the correct
motivational role.
This argument assumes (a) that there really normative reasons, and (b)
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that some are more ultimate than others. Recall from earlier that (a) can
be interpreted as minimal truth-realism about reasons, the view that at least
some sentences asserting the existence of a reason are true. And because
we could never have a reason in favor of denying this view, it seems safe to
accept. Assumption (b) is a consequence of the rational competition problem.
Since we have everyday reasons that compete with one another, the best move
is to have one kind of reason be the normative foundation for the others,
the things in virtue of which the other reasons hold. The alternative would
mean denying that some of the competing reasons are genuine, but that would
diverge significantly from general linguistic practice.
Before we consider the premises directly, it’s worth saying a bit more about
what the argument shows. The premises are meant to show that values give
the best and most ultimate reasons. Calling this the value-first view is an
improvement over two other names that are sometimes used for the idea that
values give reasons: mooreanism and teleology. We saw in chapter 2 why the
view isn’t the same as Moore’s, but we haven’t yet discussed teleology.
On its face, the value-first view may look a lot like what Scanlon has
called “teleological” conceptions of value, but it’s actually quite different.
In Scanlon’s terms, teleological conceptions of value have two distinguishing
features that the value-first view is silent about.
Teleological views take states of affairs to be the sole bearers of intrinsic
value and direct us to bring about the best possible states of affairs.2 By
contrast, the value-first view makes no claim at all about what things have
intrinsic value. It’s a view about what sorts of propositions are eligible to
favor. It also says nothing about whether or not we ought to bring about
2Scanlon 1998, pp. 79-80.
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what’s best—in fact, it says nothing at all about how strong any reasons are.
Again, it’s only a view about eligibility, not what the balance of considerations
actually favors. This is also why the value-first view is not a version of classical
consequentialism, as we saw in chapter 2.
Before we move on, it’s also worth revisiting what all this value-talk
means. We often talk about value generally, in terms of unqualified goodness
and badness. But this is best thought of as a generic way of referring to
more determinate kinds of value, like moral goodness, epistemic goodness,
prudential badness, etc. These more determinate values should map nicely on
to the different kinds of normative reasons that there are: moral, epistemic,
prudential, and others. These determinate values often have more vivid labels.
Moral value can be described as rightness, epistemic goodness is warrant or
justification, and aesthetic goodness is beauty, and so on. I don’t have much
of an argument for this claim, but recall the view of values laid out in previous
chapter. Outputs of standards of evaluation for actions and attitudes often
involve terms like rightness of justification. Moral standards tell us whether an
act was right or wrong, epistemic standards tell us whether a belief is justified,
standards of etiquette tell us whether an act was polite, and so on. Standards of
evaluation could be understood as giving verdicts only in explicitly evaluative
language, which is a possibility the value-first view could allow, but that’s just
not how we talk.
I’ll often speak of values using these other descriptors, but for those
who tend to think of justification and rightness (or whatever) are not kinds
of goodness but rather good-makers, let me re-emphasize that the view
takes justification to count in favor of things only in virtue of being a
kind of goodness. This point is important because it marks an important
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difference between the value-first and buck-passing views. On that view, every
consideration that favors is a non-value consideration about good-making
properties. If the view allowed that considerations of justification, rightness,
or beauty counted in favor intrinsically rather than in virtue of being kinds of
goodness, it would be in danger of collapsing back into buck-passing.
Here’s the plan for the rest of the chapter. We’ll look at both premises
in detail, considering basic rationales for each. As they are both controversial
in their own way, we’ll address some common objections to both. This will
require making some adjustments to the original ideas behind the premises,
but I’ll argue that there are plausible versions of both Ought Implies Can and
the Guise of the Good that avoid the objections and can still do the work the
argument requires.
3.1 Motivational Ought Implies Can
Classically, Ought Implies Can is the doctrine that if you’re obligated to do
something then it must be possible for you to accomplish it. The classical
version focuses on moral reasons, but it’s not hard to see how a similar
thought would be true of all normative reasons—which carry their own kind of
obligation—and not just moral ones. Our interest is with ultimate reasons, so
the principle will be framed around them primarily. Interpreted according to
the structure we get from the standard conception of reasons, Ought Implies
Can (for ultimate reasons) can be read in two different ways. On the one hand
is a thesis about the objects of reasons and on the other is a thesis about the
considerations that give those reasons. The object-oriented version says:
If ultimate consideration c favors some object o for an agent S,
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then S can bring about o.
And the consideration-oriented version says:
If ultimate consideration c favors some object o for an agent S,
then c can be S’s ultimate motivating consideration for o.
The object-oriented version is probably closer to the classical version of
Ought Implies Can, and it might well be true. We’ll leave that question aside
here. To the extent that the basic thought behind Ought Implies Can is true of
normative reasons, the object-oriented thesis is not the whole story. I believe
the consideration-oriented version is also true, as it appears we need it to make
sense of normative reasons as a philosophical concept. Let’s call this version
of the doctrine Motivational Ought Implies Can, or MOIC.
The primary reason for accepting MOIC is that if it’s not true, full practical
wisdom seems unattainable. The denial of MOIC would mean there are some
ultimate reasons that can’t be acted on, which means we cannot always
act for the right reasons, thus violating the idea that ethics is essentially
action-guiding. But normative reasons and the theories about them are in the
end part of the philosophical project of ethics. The most universal description
of ethics we can give is that it’s an attempt to answer the question, “what
should I do?” So ethics and the normative phenomena that populate it really
are essentially action-guiding, and that’s reason to accept MOIC.
As we saw in chapter 1, acting rationally requires an understanding of why
the objects we are intending to bring about are favored—that is, why we ought
to do what we ought to do. For example, suppose I need to take the the 9:27
bus to campus to avoid keeping my class waiting. I’ve acted in accordance
with my reasons if I’m motivated to take the 9:27, say, by a desire not to
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be impolite to the class. But I haven’t acted in accordance with reason, and
certainly not as well, if I’m motivated to take the 9:27 instead out of a mistaken
belief that it’s the only way to avoid nuclear war with the alien invasion force
waiting just beyond the moon. I may have complied with the object of my
normative reason under the latter motivation, but not the consideration that
gives it. The same goes for ultimate reasons: acting in accordance with one’s
best reasons means acting on the considerations that give them.
This is meant to be a fairly weak requirement on normative reasons. It
doesn’t require that any ultimate reasons are actual motivating considerations,
and it doesn’t require that the objects of those reasons be possible. It
requires only that every ultimate reason be a possible ultimate motivating
consideration, in the explanatory sense I outlined above.
MOIC is a modal principle, dependent on some sense of possibility. The
best candidate is psychological possibility, since no consideration can motivate
unless it’s psychologically possible to appreciate. Yet psychological possibility
resists easy definition. Let’s try to illustrate it with a few examples:
• Vividly imagining a cube that’s both entirely red and entirely blue is
psychologically impossible, but imagining that Elvis and Johnny Cash
were actually the same person is possible, generally speaking.
• Understanding what it’s like to navigate the oceans by electroception
is psychologically impossible, but understanding the axiom of choice is
possible, generally speaking, even for those who have never heard of set
theory.
• Appreciating the full causal chain between a butterfly flapping its wings
in Syracuse and next week’s weather forecast in Paris is psychologically
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impossible, but appreciating the role of unconscious bias in hiring
decisions is possible, generally speaking, even for those who don’t believe
that there is such a thing as unconscious bias.
Even though this way thinking about psychological possibility is permissive
about what’s possible, claims of psychological possibility can only be made
generally, and not universally. Accidents of age, injury, disability, etc., make
it so that very little if anything is universally psychologically possible. Similar
things may be true of impossibility.
Given that notion of psychological possibility, MOIC looks consistent
with plausible versions of both internalism and externalism about motivating
reasons. Roughly, internalism is the claim that normative reasons do motivate
people under the right conditions—or, that favoring considerations are also
motivating considerations under the right conditions—and externalism is
the denial of this claim. Internalism about ultimate reasons would look a
lot like MOIC, but they’re importantly different. Because our notion of
psychological possibility is so weak, there will be considerations that are
possibly motivating even though there are no circumstances under which they
actually do or would motivate the person in question. After all, some people
are extremely stubborn, or in the grip of a strong bias. But as long as it’s
psychologically possible for such people to think differently (be a little less
stubborn, etc.) to the point where they can be motivated by the consideration,
many non-motivating considerations will turn out to be possible motivators.
So much for the rationale behind the premise. Now we’ll consider some
objections, with the goal of showing that MOIC can avoid them. Classical
Ought Implies Can is seriously controversial, and problems with the classical
view might be thought to carry over to MOIC. Addressing all of these concerns
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would require a dissertation unto itself, and so we’ll confine ourselves to three
of the most popular.
The strongest objection to consider comes from Hume’s Guillotine, the
principle that you can’t derive an ought from an is. Many people have thought
the Guillotine is incompatible with classical Ought Implies Can. The idea is
that if obligation implies ability, then inability implies a lack of obligation.
Since the claim that something can’t be done looks like a straightforward
is and the claim that it’s not the case that it ought to be done looks like a
straightforward ought, the two doctrines appear inconsistent with one another.
Now, MOIC does imply that if a consideration isn’t motivationally possible
it cannot be an ultimate reason, and therefore it generates no obligations. But
MOIC says this not as a matter of pure logic, but rather as a substantive
and controversial view about what normative reasons do. As we saw, the
motivation for believing MOIC has to do with practical wisdom and the basic
project of ethics. By contrast, Hume’s Guillotine is a view about what can be
done with logic alone. As a matter of entailment, in order to validly infer not
an ultimate reason from not motivationally possible we would need to include
MOIC as a premise, and so a rational ought would appear in the premises. So
far so good.
But here it’s important to distinguish entailment from valid implication
more generally. When premises entail a conclusion, the inference is valid
no matter what interpretation we give to the non-logical vocabulary. So we
can’t move from not motivationally possible to not an ultimate reason under
entailment even if MOIC is analytically true. But under valid implication
we could, provided MOIC were in fact analytic. So even if it’s not possible to
generate counterexamples to Hume’s Guillotine using MOIC under entailment,
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it might still be possible to get an is-to-ought inference under valid implication.
There are two ways out of this problem. Either (a) show that MOIC is not
an analytic or conceptual truth, or (b) find a good reason to reject Hume’s
Guillotine. I’m not optimistic about the prospects of (a), since I tend to think
that MOIC might be a kind of conceptual truth, so (b) seems like the better
option. But dismissing a principle so appealing and entrenched takes a lot of
time, and would thoroughly derail the current argument. So I’ll argue against
the Guillotine in chapter 6, where I’ll try to show that no available version of
the principle is both true and adequate, and that giving it up has little cost
because it can be and replaced with the moorean view that descriptive terms
are never synonymous with normative ones. This view presents no trouble
for either classical Ought Implies Can or MOIC. Even if they are conceptual
truths, it won’t be because ‘ought’ means the same as ‘can’.
Then there’s an objection from cases in which one becomes unable to do
what one ought to, but the obligation remains all the same.3 Suppose it’s
my duty to keep order in the classroom but that I’m unable to accomplish
this because the students are just too unruly or the lectern microphone isn’t
working, and so on. These facts don’t free me from my obligation, goes the
idea. Thus I ought to keep order in the classroom, even though I can’t. Cases
like this would be counterexamples to the object-oriented version of Ought
Implies Can, if the interpretation of the examples is correct. For my part, I’m
unsure if it is. But for the sake of argument, let’s suppose the interpretation
is right—obligation can persist through periods of inability.
As the consideration-oriented version of Ought Implies Can, MOIC can
make sense of that idea. In our present terminology, saying that I’m under
3See Stocker 1971, pp. 311-312; see also Howard-Snyder 2006, p. 235.
58
an obligation to keep order is to say that there’s an ultimate consideration
that favors keeping order. Suppose for the sake of argument that it’s a
consideration of value, like <it’s the right thing to do>. According to
MOIC, this consideration cannot be an ultimate reason if it’s psychologically
impossible for me to be motivated by it. But there’s nothing in the case
suggesting that it can’t be a motivating consideration for me. I certainly can
be motivated by it’s being the right thing to do, because (let’s suppose) I have
already been motivated by it when I originally tried to establish order.
While MOIC it’s compatible with there continuing to be reasons even when
their objects may not be possible, it’s also compatible with the absence of
reasons in such cases. In other words, it’s compatible with the object-oriented
version of Ought Implies Can. MOIC is not a biconditional—just because
one is capable of being motivated by a consideration doesn’t mean that it’s a
genuine normative reason.
The second objection comes from what Michael Stocker calls “culpable
inability.” Cases of culpable inability are ones in which someone attempts to
escape obligation by rendering himself incapable of performing it. A father
who has promised to attend his child’s recital, but decides not to go because
he can’t stand the sound of kids playing violins, might seek to free himself from
his obligation by getting on a plane to Honolulu so that he’ll be in the air while
it’s going on.4 Or a teenager might shoot herself in the foot to avoid fulfilling
her promise to go on walks with her grandmother, who she finds annoying.
Clearly this is not behavior to be encouraged, and definitely not something
that a good ethical principle should license. MOIC can handle cases like these
in the same basic way as before: it’s still psychologically possible for the father
4c.f. Stocker 1971, p. 314.
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and the granddaughter to treat the consideration that <it’s morally wrong to
break the promise> as a motivator, even though they won’t. So MOIC can
allow that both still have good reasons to do the things they’re trying to avoid.
But there’s another kind of culpable inability case where this response
won’t work for MOIC. In these cases, people seek to avoid their obligations
by altering their psychology, rather than rendering the objects physically
impossible. Thus Jones might seek to avoid looking after his ailing spouse
by hiring some unsavory characters to cause him irreversible brain damage,
making it psychologically impossible to play the role of a caring spouse. Again,
there’s something seriously wrong with such behavior. But this time MOIC
has to say that once the injury occurs, there are no considerations for Jones
that favor caring for his spouse because his injury leaves him psychologically
unable to take his wedding vows into consideration.
I think it’s alright to bite the bullet here and agree that Jones has succeeded
in getting rid of the normative reason for looking after his spouse. After
all, injury is one of the things that interferes with psychological possibility.
But biting the bullet means explaining away the objectionable features of the
example. We need an account of why Jones’s behavior is wrong, and here’s
a natural one: before he injures himself, there are many considerations that
Jones can appreciate which give him reasons not to do it. There are moral
considerations towards his friends, family, and spouse, as well as prudential
considerations concerning the goods that the injury will deprive him of. His
disregard for those reasons seems to enough to capture the discomfort we
would feel about cases like this. Thus I think MOIC can also get around the
objection from culpable inability.
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So much for the first premise. Altering the focus of classical Ought Implies
Can from the objects of our reasons to the considerations that give them offers
a promising way to handle the usual objections. Now we’ll turn from the idea
that every ultimate reason is a possible motivating consideration to our second
premise, which gets us from MOIC to the value-first view of reasons by way of
the idea that the best and most fundamental explanation of our motivations
is that we’re moved by judgments of value.
3.2 The Guise of the Valuable
Going at least as far back as Plato, philosophers have been attracted to the idea
that desiring something requires thinking of it as being good in some way. This
thesis is known as the Guise of the Good. Much of the time it seems obvious
and phenomenologically right. It can be difficult to imagine wanting something
but not finding it good. The list of people who have endorsed versions of
Guise of the Good includes Aristotle, the Scholastics, Kant, Anscombe, and
Davidson.5
Arguments for the Guise of the Good often proceed from the idea that the
view is necessary to make sense of intentional action.6 Acting toward some
desired end without thinking of that end as having some sort of value appears
to be unintelligible. To borrow an example from Anscombe, suppose Smith
is trying to acquire a saucer of mud but has no explanation why. If we ask
her what she wants it for, all she can say is there isn’t any end she wants
it for, or any respect in which it’s desirable—she simply wants it, full-stop.
5See Plato’s Meno 77a-87c and Gorgias 466a-468e, the opening lines of Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics, Aquinas’s Summa Theologica, Anscombe 1957/2000, and Davidson
1980.
6See Tenenbaum 2013.
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Smith’s behavior would be pure nonsense, says Anscombe.7 Showing how
an agent regards some action as good is just what intentional explanation
amounts to, and so the Guise of the Good is a straightforward consequence of
our explanatory commitments.
As with classical Ought Implies Can, the controversy surrounding the
Guise of the Good is proportioned to its intuitiveness and popularity. Most
objections fall into two classes. Some are concerned about whether goodness
per se is always part of the content of our desires, and others are concerned
with the possibility that motivation doesn’t require any thoughts about value
at all. We’ll get to those objections shortly, but first consider an alteration of
the principle that helps us get from MOIC to the value-first view.
Since this is meant to be an argument about ultimate reasons, it’s
unnecessary to insist that only value-considerations can motivate, just as it’s
unnecessary to say that only value-considerations give normative reasons.
Other considerations can and do lead us to act, but only as part of a deeper
motivational story. As we’ve seen, given that acting well means aligning
one’s motivating reasons with one’s normative reasons, considerations of both
kinds should have the same structure. That is, where normative reasons can
be split into ultimate and non-ultimate reasons, so too can our motivating
considerations. Thus the argument needs a principle framed around ultimate
motivating considerations. Call this version of the thesis the Guise of the
Valuable, or GOV:
(GOV): Every possible ultimate motivating consideration is a consideration
of value.
71957/2000, pp. 70-71.
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Notice the two changes from classical Guise of the Good. One is the
change from desires to ultimate motivating considerations we’ve just been
discussing, and the other is a move from goodness per se to considerations of
value.
Recall that we’re thinking of motivating considerations in the explanatory
way. Ultimate motivating considerations are the most basic explanations of a
person’s action, and that’s perfectly consistent with desires being the real
psychological motivators. So the focus on desire in classical Guise of the
Good can preserved in GOV (if that’s important to you). The change to
considerations of value is needed because the value-first view takes values of
many different kinds to give reasons—like wrongness or justification—not just
considerations of the form <x is good>.
Now let’s see how GOV handles the two common kinds of objection to
Guise of the Good. The first kind suggests that people sometimes genuinely
desire the bad, so classical Guise of the Good must be false. Both Michael
Stocker and David Velleman pursue this line of reasoning.8 Velleman gives the
illustrative example of Satan in John Milton’s Paradise Lost, who upon defeat
resolves to start desiring the bad and avoiding the good, and argues that it
cannot be that Satan mistakenly thinks of bad things as good. He correctly
judges the bad as bad and chooses it under that guise.9
Since GOV is significantly weaker than classical Guise of the Good, it can
handle these cases with ease. Badness is a value just as much as goodness is,
and so the view is consistent with the notion that people can genuinely desire
or be otherwise motivated towards the bad. Yet allowing badness to motivate
8See Stocker 1979, and Velleman 1992.
9Velleman 1992, p. 18.
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may seem to conflict with the basic motivation for the Guise of the Good
we saw above. The original rationale was that any explanation of intentional
action requires showing how the agent saw his action as good in some way.
You might think that if seeing an action as bad is also sufficient to explain,
then it’s intelligible for people to be motivated by anything, even evaluatively
neutral saucers of mud.
There are at least two ways out of this worry. One is to update the basic
argument for Guise of the Good. In Anscombe’s example, it’s natural to think
of goodness as doing the work in intentional explanations, and this does seem
to be the standard interpetation. But let’s look at what she actually says.
Imagine again that Smith has told Jones about her quest for a saucer of mud.
Here’s Anscombe:
Would he [Jones] not try to find out in what aspect the object
desired is desirable? ... Now if the reply is: “Philosophers have
taught us that anything can be the object of desire” ... then this
is fair nonsense.10
This passage makes it look like desirability is what really does the work
in explanations of intentional action. This alone won’t settle what things
are desirable—if Stocker and Velleman’s examples are right, then badness is
desirable too, and is thus capable of motivating. To extend this conclusion to
neutral things, we would need a successful explanation where no value appears
at all. This sort of example constitutes the other kind of objection to classical
Guise of the Good, which we’ll get to shortly.
The second response is to highlight the role of ultimate motivating
considerations. It could be that Milton’s Satan is moved by evil qua evil,
101957/2000, pp. 70-71.
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but this may not be the end of the story. Someone can want the bad as bad
instrumentally as a way of satisfying a desire to frustrate the aims of one’s
enemy, which would be a kind of goodness. On this telling of the example,
Satan would genuinely be moved to badness, but non-fundamentally. His
more ultimate motivation would still be given by positive value. This is, of
course, just another version of the usual response to cases like this, but the
introduction of ultimate and non-ultimate reasons gives us a way to preserve a
sense in which atypical agents like Satan are genuinely motivated by badness,
which other versions may have a hard time doing. Thus GOV need not be
understood as the claim that ultimate motivating considerations are sometimes
given by badness, even though it’s consistent with it.
The second group of objections to the classical Guise of the Good comes
from examples purporting to show that thinking of value isn’t required at all
for motivation. One such example comes from Jonathan Dancy. Suppose that
Jonathan has promised his children that if they do their homework on time, he
will tie his right shoe before his left on even-numbered days, and his left shoe
before his right on odd-numbered days. Dancy says that he’ll be motivated
to tie his shoes in that way (provided the kids are doing their homework),
even though he sees absolutely no value in it.11 Another example comes from
Joseph Raz, who describes a miner who is motivated to refuse a buy-out offer
from managers that are intent on shutting down the mine. Asked if he thinks
his refusal offers any hope of keeping the mine open, the miner will say no—it’s
just the right thing to do on principle.12
If these cases are right, then both Guise of the Good and GOV are false
because motivation can occur without any consideration of value. I think
11Dancy 2000, p. 168.
12Raz 2010, pp. 112-113.
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these are powerful objections to classical Guise of the Good, but the key to
responding on behalf of GOV is there in the miner’s answer. The miner says
refusing the buy-out is the right thing to do, and presumably Dancy would
say that following through with his promise is the right thing to do. While
it might be that neither sees goodness per se nor prudential value in what
they’re doing, they do see moral value in it, insofar as they think they’re
doing the right thing. Because rightness is also a value, neither of these cases
is a problem for GOV. I suspect the thought behind this kind of objection is
aimed at thinking of things as being good or bad, without qualification. GOV
allows for people to be motivated by the more determinate, qualified forms of
value, and so it’s not a target for this kind of criticism in the way that classical
Guise of the Good is. To get an example that truly challenges GOV, we need a
case of motivation in which no values of any kind could be playing an ultimate
motivating role. To my knowledge, none of the critics of the Guise of the Good
have offered any, and cases like Anscombe’s saucer of mud suggest there won’t
be any.
That wraps up the argument for the value-first view: all the ultimate
normative reasons are possible ultimate motivating resaons, and all the
ultimate motivating reasons are considerations of value. Therefore, every
ultimate normative reasons is a consideration of value. Or to put in a slogan,
ought implies can and can implies value.
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Chapter 4
Rational Redundancy &
Rational Exclusion
Now that we’ve seen the positive case for the value-first view, we turn to
the primary—and perhaps only—argument against it: Scanlon’s redundancy
argument. This chapter is about understanding how the argument works. I’ll
show that it has to be seen as a kind of exclusion argument if it’s going to
work at all. Properly understood, it alleges competition between goodness and
good-makers for giving the same reason and concludes that the good-makers
win out. This might seem rather obvious, but nailing down the terms of the
argument is essential for the considerations I’ll give against it in chapter 5.
Many philosophers seem to have found the redundancy argument
persuasive, including many who don’t also accept Scanlon’s buck-passing
theory of value. This is likely why so much of what’s been written about
the buck-passing view focuses on the Wrong Kind of Reasons problem and
ignores the redundancy argument entirely. I certainly agree that there’s
something intuitively compelling about the threat of redundancy. If some
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instance of goodness gave an independent reason from the reasons given by
its good-makers, that seems like one reason too many, at least at first glance.
That’s how the rational competition problem arises in the first place. But few
appear to recognize that we’ve heard this story before.
No so long ago, causal exclusion arguments against non-reductive
physicalism about the mental were also quite popular. Roughly speaking, the
worry was that because non-reductive physicalists believe mental properties
are realized by—but non-identical to—physical properties, and that the causal
powers of the mental supervene on the causal powers of the physical, their view
leaves no causal work for the mental properties to do.1 Take some mental
state, which has physical properties P and mental properties M . The claim
of the exclusion argument is that because any causal powers of the M would
be had in virtue of the P ’s causal powers, the P must be causally sufficient.
But if the P are sufficient on their own, then the M have nothing to add.
If they did have something to add then there would be widespread causal
overdetermination, which is tremendously unlikely and difficult to accept.
Thus the reductionists concluded that if non-reductivism were true, nothing
we do is caused by our mental properties.2 Interestingly, this amounts to an
exclusion objection against motivating reasons as well. From the beginning,
non-reductivists like Davidson were concerned to make sense of how we act in
virtue of higher-level mental states like beliefs, decisions, and desires.3 If these
things don’t cause us to act, it’s safe to assume they’re not motivating us.
Now compare Scanlon’s argument:
1For a nice explanation of the causal exclusion argument, see Fodor 1989.
2See especially Kim 1992.
3See for instance the opening paragraphs of his 1970b.
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First, when I consider particular cases it seems that these reasons are
provided by the natural properties that make a thing good or valuable.
So, for example, the fact that a resort is pleasant is a reason to visit it
or recommend it to a friend, and the fact that a discovery sheds light
on the causes of cancer is a reason to applaud it and to support further
research of that kind. These natural properties provide a complete
explanation of the reasons we have for reacting in these ways to things
that are good or valuable. It is not clear what further work could be
done by special reason-providing properties of value, and even less clear
how these properties could provide reasons.4
The situation for normative reasons is structurally the same as the one that
sets up non-reductive physicalism for exclusion worries. We have realization of
value by value-makers, and we have supervenience of reason-giving powers. If
the natural properties of the resort had been different (if it had been even more
pleasant, say), then the reason-giving powers of the resort’s goodness would
be different too (there presumably would be even more reason to go). Finally,
we also have basic commitment not multiply reasons needlessly. Scanlon tells
us that value-makers are already sufficient to account for all the reasons there
are, so given the basic facts above, he concludes that value is excluded: none
of the reasons we have are given by something’s being good.
Now despite its intuitive appeal, the causal exclusion objection was not the
end of the story for non-reductive physicalism about the mental. The trouble
with exclusion arguments is that they exhibit the following weakness. They
are held hostage to individual judgments about what should get excluded when
competition arises. Everyone should agree that widespread causal or rational
4Scanlon 1998, p. 97.
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overdetermination is a problem, but since exclusion arguments often don’t do
more than suggest their author’s preferred way of resolving the competition,
they shouldn’t be very effective without an agreed-upon procedure for resolving
the conflict.5 There are a number of promising responses to causal exclusion
already available, and so seeing Scanlon’s objection to the idea that goodness
gives reasons as a claim of exclusion is important because it enables us to
ask whether similar responses are available in the case of normative reasons.
I’ll discuss the strategies for avoiding exclusion in the next chapter. Here I
simply want to defend the idea that rational redundancy is nothing but rational
exclusion.
The fact that it’s helpful to think of Scanlon as giving an exclusion
argument is no reason to believe it, though. The main reason for thinking
this must be Scanlon’s argument is that unless it’s a claim of exclusion, the
conclusion that value never gives reasons doesn’t follow. That’s one of the
things I’ll argue in the third section. But first say a bit about what the
argument shows, and what it would look like if it were understood as an
exclusion argument.
4.1 What does the argument show?
Some philosophers acknowledge a distinction between full-fledged and
derivative reasons. Suppose for example that the consideration <I enjoy Alto
Cinco’s breakfast chorizo> gives me a reason to go there for breakfast. Given
that I enjoy it, the fact that <Alto Cinco serves breakfast chorizo> may also
give me a reason. But in this context it seems wrong to say that <Alto Cinco
5c.f. Hooker and Stratton-Lake 2006, who suggest that the redundancy argument is
in danger of assuming what its opponents deny, namely that value-making properties are
sufficient on their own.
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serves breakfast chorizo> gives an additional reason. Whatever force it has
is derivative on the force of <I enjoy Alto Cinco’s breakfast chorizo>, or so
you might think.6 In the language of the standard conception of normative
reasons, we can say that some considerations favor independently and some
favor derivatively.
Scanlon’s view appears to be that value propositions don’t give reasons of
any kind, even derivative ones. He says clearly that “being valuable is not a
property that provides us with reasons.”7 But it’s not obvious that this is the
right thing for the buck-passer to say.
Mark Schroeder argues that Scanlon is wrong to think this. Instead, he
suggests buck-passers should say that value propositions are excluded from
favoring independently, while allowing that they can be derivative reasons.8
According to the positive buck-passing thesis, value facts are identical to
facts about the existence of other reason-giving properties. So considerations
of value will be propositions asserting the existence of these other reasons.
Schroeder argues that understood in this way, value-considerations do give
derivative reasons. He gives following example to illustrate.
Imagine there’s a big surprise waiting for Nate in the living room. Nate
loves good surprises and hates ruined ones, so we cannot tell him why he really
ought to go into the living room without taking away his reason. The most
we can tell him is that he has a reason to go, which is a value-consideration.
Now since acting well means having one’s motivating reasons correspond to
one’s normative reasons, and it’s possible for Nate to do well in this scenario by
acting on the consideration that <there’s a reason to go into the living room>,
6More examples like this can be found in Schroeder 2011.
7Scanlon 1998, pp. 96.
8Schroeder 2011, pp. 344-345.
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it follows that the value-consideration did give him a derivative normative
reason. In this way, value propositions can be seen as place-holders for the
value-making considerations that give independent reasons.9
This leaves us with two important takeaways. One is that the redundancy
argument is probably better thought of as concluding that values don’t give
independent reasons, rather than the claim that they give no reasons at all.
This would still be enough to show that the value-first view is false, since
ultimate reasons are independent reasons. The second is that it doesn’t follow
from the buck-passer’s claim that values are higher-order properties of there
being other reason-giving properties that values don’t give any reasons at all.
That is, the negative buck-passing thesis is not a logical consequence of the
positive thesis. So buck-passers are not entitled to simply assert the positive
thesis and use that as evidence against the value-first view.
Indeed, the negative thesis remains independent from the positive one even
when they’re re-interpreted by Schroeder’s lights. The fact that goodness is
the property of there being other independent-reason-giving properties doesn’t
guarantee on its own that the higher-order goodness property doesn’t also give
independent reasons. We need the additional premise that such reasons should
be thought of as derivative in some way before we can conclude that values
don’t give independent reasons. We’ll return to this point later on.
4.2 Exclusion as a counterfactual
Although it’s meant to appeal to more intuitive ideas, talk about redundancy
and exclusion is just metaphor. After all, exclusion and redundancy are
things that people and other intentional things do, not mind-independent
9See also Vayrynen 2006, p. 297; and Kagan 1989, p. 60.
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metaphysical phenomena. It would be nice to have a more literal way of
making such claims. In this section I’ll show how we can capture the main
thought behind the argument with a counterfactual exclusion claim about
what would happen if values were subtracted from the world while their makers
remained fixed.
Concerns about exclusion are in the end concerns about what has
powers—be they causal or normative—and having a power means making
a difference. Counterfactuals are well-suited to express views about
difference-making. If x makes a causal difference, then we can say that if
x hadn’t happened, then things would have turned out differently. And if
x makes no causal difference, then we can say that if x hadn’t happened,
things would have turned out the same. Now, there are well-known problems
with using counterfactuals to analyze the concept of causation, but I’m
not proposing an analysis. These are just conditionals. The problems for
counterfactual analyses arise because some things that are not plausibly the
cause of some event still meet the counterfactual criteria. It might be true that
if I didn’t own my car I wouldn’t have wrecked it, but that’s no reason to think
that my owning the car was the definitive cause of the crash. Whether owning
the car makes a causal difference may be an open question, but we needn’t
take a stand on that. The proposal is just that if you have a view about
whether something makes a causal difference, that implies a counterfactual.
Normative reasons work in the same way: to count in favor is to make
a difference to what we ought to do. And so if x gives reasons, its doing so
implies that if x had not been the case and other things were equal, what
we ought to do would have been different. Conversely, if x doesn’t give
reasons, its failing to do so implies that if x had not been the case and other
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things were equal, what we ought to do would say the same. If goodness and
other values don’t give reasons, then this second principle should be true of
them. So we can capture the basic idea of the redundancy argument—that
values are redundant because value-making properties have done all the work
already—with the following principle of rational exclusion (PORE):
(PORE): For all values X, value-makers of X, Y , and favored objects
Z, if any of the X were subtracted while the set of Y was held fixed, the set
of Z would remain unchanged.
More plainly, PORE says that if we subtracted value from the world
but held everything else constant that we can, logically speaking, our
normative reasons would be the same.
It might seem as though buck-passers can’t accept PORE because of their
positive thesis that goodness is the property of there being other reason-giving
properties. If that’s true, one might worry that there simply are no situations
in which there could be reasons without there being value as well. Now,
whether or not Scanlon and other buck-passers can adopt PORE is a bit beside
the point here. This chapter is about turning a loose-talking argument given
in metaphors into a straightforwardly intelligible objection to the value-first
view of reasons. I’ll argue in the next section that PORE is the only way to
do this. If the positive buck-passing thesis prevents someone like Scanlon from
believing in this principle, so much the better for the value-first view, as its
critics won’t be able to state their objection clearly. That said, I don’t see any
reason why buck-passers would need to reject it.
First of all, even if it were logically impossible for there to be reasons
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without values, PORE could still be true. Nearly everyone thinks modus
ponens is logically necessary, but it could still be non-vacuously true that if
modus ponens were false, all our logic teachers would have been wrong. Even
though the nearest worlds where it’s false are impossible, it stands to reason
that at such worlds the logic would clearly have been wrong. In the same
way, it stands to reason that if the nearest worlds where reasons exist without
values are impossible, they would be ones where our reasons remain the same,
if the redundancy argument is right.
But of course it’s very unlikely that anyone thinks of the positive
buck-passing thesis as logically necessary. Water and H2O might not have
been identical, just as the descriptions the morning star and the evening
star might have referred to different celestial objects. Identities are generally
not considered logically necessary. And even if the positive thesis is analytic
rather than logically necessary, it’s still consistent with PORE. There’s nothing
wrong with believing on the one hand that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’
are synonymous while believing on the other that if they had meant different
things, the nearest worlds where all the bachelors fail to shave themselves
might be worlds where all the unmarried men still do. So there’s no reason
why it would be inconsistent to think that x and y are identical and also have
a view about what would be the case if they weren’t. There are plenty of
possible worlds that we can test such a view against.10
That aside, there are two related objections that don’t hinge on the positive
buck-passing thesis. The first concerns the difficulty of evaluating PORE. One
might think that since evaluating PORE requires us to make judgments about
far-away possible worlds, we cannot say whether it’s true or false. The second
10If you’re the kind of philosopher who thinks metaphysical and logical possibility are
coextensive, see above.
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is that worlds where there are reasons but no values are too far removed from
the actual to be normatively relevant. That is, those worlds don’t belong in a
model of normative reasons for beings like us and so PORE doesn’t bear on
them—be it true or false. We’ll address these more directly in chapter 5, but
here it’s worth saying a bit about the motivation behind them.
In both cases the primary worry is charity. If PORE is un-evaluable
or irrelevant, then it may seem wrong to pin it on Scanlon. Yet charity
can become a consideration only when there is more than one option for
understanding a view or argument. Because PORE, or something very close
to it, is necessary to get the conclusion that values don’t give reasons, these
objections aren’t so much of a reason not to interpret Scanlon this way as they
are reasons for thinking that premises of the redundancy argument are false.
And we need at least one of the premises to come out false for the value-first
view to succeed. That’s why we’ll postpone discussing them until the next
chapter.
4.3 Rational redundancy = PORE
The last section illustrated how we can view the redundancy argument as
employing a counterfactual exclusion principle. Now the task is to show that
we need to see it that way. There are three points of defense. The first is that
PORE is consistent with the goals of people who would cite the redundancy
argument as a reason not to accept the value-first view of reasons.
For some, showing that value doesn’t give reasons is important because it
makes ethics simpler. If the fact that something is good never gives anyone a
reason, then we don’t have to consider what’s good and what’s bad when we’re
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trying to figure out what we ought to do. As Gerald Lang puts it, denying
reason-giving powers to value means we can “pour all our philosophical energy
into identifying reasons, rather than into identifying values.” 11 A.C. Ewing was
also someone who thought simplicity is an advantage of denying that values
favor. He argued that his view that things are good because it’s fitting to
have pro-attitudes towards them (and not the other way around) is superior
because of the economy of requiring only one basic normative concept, namely
fittingness.12
If Ewing and Lang are right—and I take no stand on whether they
are—the simplicity gained by denying reason-giving powers to values is a
point in favor of thinking that PORE is true. When other things are equal,
reducing the number of basic normative concepts is a theoretical virtue, and
so considerations of theory choice give a defeasible reason to adopt views that
can deliver this. And so it should be clear that PORE is compatible with the
goal of simplicity. If value propositions make no difference in the sphere of
reasons, then ethics can proceed as if there weren’t any. Because PORE allows
us to be methodological nihilists about value, doing ethics would turn out to
be simpler than originally thought, if it’s true.
For people like Scanlon who endorse the positive buck-passing thesis, the
redundancy argument is an important part of the motivation for that view.
Scanlon makes this clear when he says that buck-passing is supported in two
different ways: the redundancy argument and the idea that there is no single
reason-giving thing that valuable things have in common. About the second
motivation, he says:
...many different things can be said to be good or to be valuable,
11Lang 2008, p. 473.
12Ewing 1948, pp. 166-169.
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and the grounds for these judgments vary widely. There does not
seem to be a singe, reason-providing property that is common to
all these cases.13
The interesting thing about this second motivator is that it’s dependent on
the first. If values did give reasons, then the property of being valuable would
be the reason-giving property that all the instances of valuable things had
in common. If it weren’t for the redundancy argument, this would be no
motivation at all. Thus it’s important that PORE be consistent with Scanlon’s
positive view, and we’ve already seen that it is. Those who think that value
facts are identical to facts about the existence of reasons can still have a view
about what would happen if they weren’t.
The second point of defense is that PORE would be sufficient for the
conclusion the redundancy argument needs, that values don’t give reasons.
If we take Scanlon’s own claim literally, all we get is that:
It is not clear what further work could be done by special
reason-providing properties of value, and even less clear how these
properties could provide reasons.14
If it’s simply unclear how values could give reasons, that’s not really an
objection to the value-first view. It might be that we can be sure that values
do give reasons, but we’re still be unsure how they do, given the rational
competition problem. This is a small point but it’s important. Scanlon
and others who champion the redundancy argument have presumably had
something stronger in mind all along, but it’s important to make that explicit.
PORE does that well.
13Scanlon 1998, pp. 97-98.
14Scanlon 1998, pp. 97.
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This brings us to the third point of defense, which is that none of the
obvious alternatives to PORE are able to deliver the conclusion that values
don’t give independent reasons. As I see it, the alternative features of value
that might do the work of showing why it doesn’t give reasons are these.
(a) ontological inheritance
(b) causal inheritance
(c) being higher-order
(d) explanatory inheritance
(e) giving instrumental reasons
We’ll look at each of these in turn, and I’ll argue that none of these can work
as the thought behind the redundancy argument. Some are just not true of
value, and the rest fail to deliver the conclusion we need.
4.3.1 (a) Ontological inheritance
Ontological inheritance is a common notion in philosophy. Plato held the view
that things inherit their reality from the forms they instantiate. Others claim
that higher-level scientific properties, like the properties of geology, are realized
by their lower-level counterparts in chemistry and physics. And many think
that when some clay composes a statue, the statue depends for its existence
on the clay, to name just a few examples. As we’ve seen, goodness and other
values are realized in this way by lower-level, non-normative value-making
properties. If we understood the redundancy argument as appealing to
ontological inheritance, then it would go as follows. Reasons given by value
would be derivative at best because value properties could not exist without the
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non-evaluative properties they depend on, and so the reasons they give could
not exist without those other properties. Reasons given by value-making facts
would be independent because they aren’t ontologically dependent in this way.
Yet this explanation seems to get things backwards, at least by comparison
with other cases of ontological inheritance. As a rule, x’s inheriting its
existence from y doesn’t interfere with x’s ability to give meaningful reasons.
Consider the standard example of Lumpl the clay, and Goliath, the statue
composed by Lumpl. Goliath depends for its existence on Lumpl in the
relevant way, but it is far from clear that reasons given by Goliath should
be derivative or less meaningful just because of that dependence. If Goliath
is a prized statue, it will provide reasons for its preservation that are at least
as meaningful and genuine—if not more so—than the reasons Lumpl gives. If
any reasons are derivative in this case, they are the reasons Lumpl provides.
Or, consider mental states like pain. The state of a person’s being in pain
plausibly depends for its existence on lower-level chemical states of the brain.
But this is no reason to think that the reasons a person’s pain gives us to
alleviate it or take account of it are derivative or less meaningful. Again, if
there are derivative reasons here, they are the reasons given by the lower-level
brain states.
Now compare the situation if a principle like PORE were true of statues
and mental states. I don’t think any such principle is true, of course, but
suppose for the sake of argument that it were. Then subtracting statues or
pain from the world, while keeping Lumpl and the lower-level states, would
make no difference to what we ought to do. That alone is sufficient to show
us that any reasons given by statues or pain are dependent on the lower-level
states. So, an exclusion principle would give a much better explanation of why
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statues and pain are normatively inert (if that were a fact to be explained) than
an appeal to their ontological dependence. This suggests that PORE gives a
much better defense of the idea that reasons given by value are derivative than
an appeal to ontological dependence. Values do inherit their existence from
their makers, but that alone is insufficient to show that they favor derivatively
or not at all.
Some may object that the statue and pain cases are importantly
disanalogous to values. Perhaps not only do values inherit their existence,
maybe the the derivative reasons they provide do too. These reasons would
depend for their existence on the independent reasons given by non-value facts
on which the values depend. According to our new explanation, it would be
this inheritance relation between reasons, rather than the one between values
and their makers, that’s responsible for exclusion. This is in contrast to the
statue and pain cases.
But swapping out the things related by ontological inheritance doesn’t
help much on its own. On the new view, the argument must be that the
reasons given by values are derivative precisely because they inherit their
existence. Now compare that rationale with our statue and pain cases. It’s
not obvious that a statue is less fully an object just because it’s ontologically
dependent, or that pain is less of a mental state. Likewise, I don’t think an
ontologically dependent reason would be any less of a reason. Of course, people
have given arguments for deflationism or nihilism about composite objects and
eliminativism about mental states on the basis of their relationships with their
lower-level realizers.15 And the fact that those views need sustained arguments
with additional premises shows that it’s not obvious. Those who adopt this
15See for example van Inwagen 1990, and Churchland 1981, respectively.
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revised view will have to claim that the redundancy argument is doing the
same thing as those arguments, and that seems implausible given what Scanlon
actually says.
4.3.2 (b) Causal inheritance
Alternatively, one could resist PORE as the center of the redundancy
argument by claiming that values inherit their causal powers. Like ontological
inheritance, causal inheritance is often put to work in arguments for
deflationism or nihilism about some domain. Trenton Merricks argues that
composite things would have to inherit their causal powers from the simples
that make them up in his baseball argument for compositional nihilism about
material objects.16 And Jaegwon Kim has argued that if mental states inherit
their causal powers from their neurological realizers, that casts doubt on the
idea that mental events do not reduce to those realizers.17 If values inherit their
causal powers from non-value facts, then this could be the idea behind rational
redundancy. This would be a causal exclusion claim about reasons—because
all the causal work is done by non-value facts, there’s something suspicious or
derivative about reasons coming from values.
Similar arguments to the ones above will dispatch the idea that something’s
inheriting its causal powers shows us that any reasons it gives would be
less genuine or derivative. Consider the case of pain again, and suppose
that conscious mental states like pain inherit their causal powers from their
lower-level neurological realizers. As we’ve seen, it won’t follow on that basis
that the state of pain gives less genuine reasons.18 Compare again what an
16Merricks 2001.
17Kim 1991.
18See for instance Fodor, 1989.
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exclusion principle would show. If someone’s being in pain makes no difference
to what we ought to do, then any reasons given by pain do appear suspect.
And as before, if the causal exclusion claim is instead meant to say that there’s
something ontologically—rather than normatively—suspicious about reasons
provided by goodness, the interpretation of the redundancy argument we’re left
with seems at odds with what advocates of the redundancy argument appear
to mean. Plausibly, many ordinary things inherit their causal powers, but it
takes much more than that fact to cast doubt on them. PORE can license the
inference to the conclusion that values don’t give independent reasons without
the additional cost.
4.3.3 (c) Being higher-order
Some might resist the equation of PORE with redundancy by appealing to
simplicity. Perhaps the redundancy argument just needs to be understood as
a consequence of the positive buck-passing thesis: value facts are higher-order
facts about the existence of other reason-giving properties, and higher-order
facts contribute nothing over and above the lower-order facts they depend
on. This reasoning seems natural enough. The higher-order fact of there
being causally efficacious properties would have nothing causal to add over the
powers of its first-order realizers. And the fact of having mass does wouldn’t
contribute to a thing’s mass, and so on.
This line of reasoning might be tempting, but it’s not a good candidate
for understanding Scanlon’s argument. If buck-passers lean on the positive
thesis to defend the redundancy argument, they will be undercutting the only
independent motivation they have for it, as we saw above. The claim that
value facts are higher-order is something buck-passers need to argue for, not
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evidence for the claim of redundancy.
Of course, critics of the value-first view need not find themselves in
Scanlon’s dialectical position. One could have independent reasons for thinking
value-facts are higher-order in this way. Still, this won’t do. Schroeder’s
surprise party example showed that higher-order facts do give reasons, and we
would need some further premise to get to the conclusion that those reasons
are derivative in some way. The cases of higher-order facts about causation
and mass could be thought to provide evidence for the idea that higher-order
facts are always derivative, but there’s an important difference between those
cases and normative reasons. The relations of causing and adding mass are
extensional, while the relation of counting in favor is intensional. So absent
a reason to think this difference is irrelevant, the critics are still missing a
premise.
4.3.4 (d) Explanatory inheritance
Advocates of rational redundancy could instead hope to shore up the
argument with the idea that values inherit their explanatory power from
value-makers, and that explanations from value alone are uninformative. This
is explanatory inheritance. Plausibly, specific instances of general laws inherit
their explanatory power in this way. My explanation that a particular bird
has blue feathers on its wing because it’s a drake Mallard gets its explanatory
force from the general rule that all male Mallards have such plumage. Without
the rule, my explanation fails to inform. If this is true of value then any
explanation from value would have to be shorthand for the explanation the
relevant non-value facts provide. So on this view, to explain that I ought to
choose a certain item from a restaurant menu because it’s good would be to
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give the very same explanation as that I ought to choose it because it tastes a
lot like something I enjoyed as a child, and because it’s low-fat, and so on.
This may look like a promising account of the redundancy argument, since
to give a normative reason is to give a kind of explanation. But there are a
couple of reasons why explanatory inheritance won’t work. The first is the
argument from chapter 3. If the Guise of the Valuable is right, non-value
considerations are never the ultimate explanation of our motivations. And
if Motivational Ought Implies Can is true, the very possibility of practical
wisdom rests on the fact that there can never be best and most ultimate reasons
that aren’t possible ultimate reasons. The best reasons, and therefore the best
explanations of why should do or think something, are value considerations.
Relatedly, open question considerations cast doubt on the idea the values
inherit their explanatory power. Appealing to value can add something to
explanations beyond what appeals to non-value facts can offer. Depending on
the context and background beliefs of my dinner companions, my explanation
that I ought to choose the meal I did because of its similarity to food I enjoyed
as a child, because of its fat content, and so on, may fail to be informative.
In spite of the information I’ve given, it can be an open question why I
should choose that dish. Conversely, if I explain that I ought to choose it
because it’s good, the question no longer seems open. Scanlon himself cites this
phenomenon as the thing that led him to consider the buck-passing theory.19
This seems like a good reason to deny the explanatory inheritance claim. If
critics of the value-first view endorse PORE instead, they can underwrite their
argument without needing to confront these.
19Scanlon, 1998, p. 96.
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4.3.5 (e) Giving instrumental reasons
Our final option lies with instrumental reasons. One could try to fill out the
redundancy argument with the idea that the reasons values give are merely
instrumental, as opposed to the basic or final reasons given by non-value
facts. If instrumental reasons are derivative or superfluous, the ends given
by non-value facts would give all the independent reasons there are. Thus it
would be no wonder that values don’t give independent or ultimate reasons,
and that ethics can proceed as if they didn’t exist.
Once again, this is a tempting line of argument. But this way offers little
improvement over the others. The problem is that instrumental reasons do
not appear to be derivative in the relevant sense. One way of explaining
instrumental reasons is that they’re reasons only to the extent that they work
in service of a further end. But that’s importantly different from the idea that
ends or their qualities give a complete explanation of instrumental reasons,
which is what this version of the redundancy argument would require.
For example, suppose one of my ends is to satisfy my desire to climb the
peak of some difficult and remote mountain, although my desire allows for
some latitude in how that’s accomplished. And suppose that there are three
routes to the summit, offering varying prospects for success. I know that if I
take Route A, the probability of my reaching the summit successfully is 7/8,
if I take Route B, the probability drops to 1/2, and there is a 1/5 probability
if I go by Route C. Assume I have no other ends that bear on which route
to take. In this case I have instrumental reason to choose Route A, but that
reason cannot be explained only by my desire to reach the summit. To explain
it, we need to appeal to the further fact that Route A is the most likely to lead
me to my goal, and so the instrumental reason I have for choosing that way
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is non-redundant. Similar arguments would show the same for many other
instrumental reasons. So, the idea that the reasons given by values would be
instrumental to the ends given by non-value facts is no argument for the claim
that they are redundant.
To avoid this conclusion, advocates of redundancy would need to show that
the assumption that there are no other ends that bear on the decision among
routes is unallowable, that there are always other ends that work together to
single out one option. One might think that people typically adopt the end of
pursuing their other ends in the way that’s most expedient, to the extent that
it’s compatible with the other reasons they have. And perhaps second-order
ends like are what make instrumental reasons redundant.
This strategy is not very plausible, though. The second-order end
of expediency is not a good candidate to be an end in the first place,
because it can never be satisfied except in cases where a person has attained
all their goals and never adopts any more. Instead, we should view the
norm of expediency in practical reasoning as expressing the fact that some
reasons are instrumental rather than basic. In spite of the fact that we
would not have any instrumental reasons were it not for the ends that
we have, norms of practical reasoning like expediency show that there are
some practical problems that ends alone do not settle, or account for. And
that is compatible with allowing that instrumental reasons are non-redundant.
So to conclude, PORE appears to be the best option the friend of the
redundancy argument has for making the argument a straightforward objection
to the value-first view of reasons. And if that’s right, we now have a
basic strategy for mounting a response. If there are good reasons all things
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considered to believe PORE, then the value-first view is probably wrong. If
not, then it might have some promise after all. We’ll pursue this line of defense
in the next chapter.
88
Chapter 5
Against Rational Exclusion
Think of a funny joke. Now imagine that all the things that contribute to
the joke’s comedic value—like context, delivery, and psychology—were held
fixed, but the joke no longer had the property of being funny. That’s an odd
situation, but it’s coherently imaginable. The kind of question we’re going to
consider in this chapter is whether the reasons for laughing at the joke change
when we hold the comedy-makers fixed and take the value away. If the answer
is no, then being funny or being a good joke are rationally excluded. That is,
those values don’t give reasons. We’ll consider this example, along with other
cases involving of normative reasons, to help decide whether value is excluded
across the board.
In chapter 4, I argued that Scanlon’s redundancy argument against the
idea that values give the best and most ultimate reasons (the value-first view),
is at bottom an exclusion objection. The goal for this chapter will be to defend
against that objection by arguing against the principle of rational exclusion
(PORE). If this succeeds, then the most significant obstacle for the value-first
view will have been removed.
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Think of the redundancy argument as having two premises:
(a) PORE, and
(b) if PORE, then values don’t give reasons.
I’ll argue that both of these premises are questionable, though we’ll
focus more on (a) than (b). First I’ll suggest that even if PORE were true, it
might make no difference to the reasons we actually have. This would mean
that premise (b) is false. Then I’ll show how PORE appears to create a
regress in which all our normative reasons would disappear. The same basic
thought in PORE that excludes value will also exclude most familiar things
from giving normative reasons. And that means that most if not all of the
considerations that give reasons are considerations we cannot understand,
and thus not reasons at all because the very possibility of practical wisdom
rests with the idea that we can act for the right reasons. This would make
premise (a) false. Either way, the redundancy argument fails.
Before we look at those arguments, let’s review how we got here. The
value-first view is a solution to the rational competition problem, which arises
because common sense wants to allow that both values and their makers give
reasons for the same things. That this is the right solution to the problem
is implied by the versions of Ought Implies Can and the Guise of the Good
we saw in chapter 3. The value-first view says that every ultimate normative
reason is a consideration of value, where values are are the typical outputs
of standards of evaluation for actions and attitudes. So our best and most
fundamental reasons are always considerations of the form <x is F -ly good>
or <x is F -ly bad>, which is precisely what Scanlon’s redundancy argument
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denies. That’s why the argument has to be met for the value-first view to
come out looking defensible.
So much for introduction. In the next section we’ll consider whether PORE
can be reliably evaluated and whether it makes any difference to our actual
reasons. Then we’ll tackle PORE itself, and lay out the regress argument
against it. If what I argue is right, concerns about exclusion should no longer
threaten to undermine the value-first view of normative reasons.
5.1 The relevance of PORE
Roughly, PORE says that if we subtracted value from the world while holding
everything else fixed that we logically can, our normative reasons would
remain exactly the same. We can capture that idea more precisely by saying:
(PORE): For all values X, value-makers of X, Y , and favored objects
Z, if any of the X were subtracted while the set of Y was held fixed, the set
of Z would remain unchanged.
One immediate difficulty is that this claim is pretty abstract. It can
be difficult to think clearly about what things would be like if the antecedent
of PORE were true. That’s where the joke case from above comes in handy.
That thought experiment is a test for a specific instance of PORE. We took a
joke, took the comedic value away, held fixed everything else, and then asked
what our reasons would be. If our reasons with respect to the joke would be
exactly the same, that means that comedic value—that is to say, the property
of being funny—is excluded from giving reasons. And if our reasons would
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change, that means that PORE is false when it comes to reasons of comedy.
If this kind of value makes no difference to the existence of reasons, then it
certainly doesn’t give them. The same goes for all the other kinds of value.
If moral values, epistemic values, prudential values, aesthetic values, and the
rest make no difference to the distribution of reasons, then they don’t give
them. But if they do make a difference, then the claim of rational exclusion
can’t be the reason that value considerations don’t count in favor of things,
because the claim is false.
To be clear, this way of combating the exclusion objection does not offer
a way re-affirm that values do give reasons, as a sort of back-up argument
to the one from chapter 3. Evaluating PORE won’t be able to show this. If
subtracting value while holding everything else fixed did change the reasons we
have, all that shows is that values make a difference to what reasons there are.
And while anything that gives reasons would make a difference in this way,
simply making a difference is not sufficient for reason-giving. That’s because
there are other ways to make a difference to what reasons there are.
For an obvious example, consider the existence of the universe and the
existence of rational beings like us. These make a difference to nearly all
of the reasons there are—if there were no universe or no rational beings like
us, then the reasons we have not to torture people would disappear. But
that fact is hardly evidence for thinking that the existence of those things
give reasons against torture. These are rational background conditions, so
to speak, rather than actual reason-givers. This point mirrors a common
objection to difference-making theories of causation. Analyzing causes in terms
of difference-making dramatically over-generates causes, so the objection goes.
The fact that I have bones makes a difference to the breaking of my arm,
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but it’s not the cause of the break. And the fact that my house is not
currently on fire makes a difference to whether I’m writing my dissertation
at this moment, but again is not the cause of my writing.1 Given the analogy
between normative reasons and causes, this is likely not surprising.
So, thought experiments like the joke case can help us to test PORE, but
they can’t weigh in on the value-first view more generally. Here are some other
examples.
• Aesthetic Reasons
Imagine a good work of art and the reasons it generates. Now imagine
subtracting whatever aesthetic value it has (its beauty, perhaps) while
holding all of its good-making qualities fixed. Are our aesthetic reasons
the same as they were before the subtraction?
• Moral Reasons
Take something that’s morally wrong (or morally bad) and consider the
reasons we have for preventing it. Then suppose that it’s no longer
wrong, but its wrong-making features remain, and consider whether our
moral reasons for avoiding the thing will change.
• Epistemic Reasons
Think of beliefs and the reasons that justify them. Then ask whether the
epistemic reasons for believing or disbelieving them would change if the
justification were removed while the properties that made for justification
remained fixed.
• Prudential Reasons
Consider something prudentially good, maybe an efficient means to your
1See similar points in Menzies 2004.
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ends. Will the reasons you have for pursuing this thing change if the
prudential goodness is taken away but the efficiency remains?
There are other kinds of normative reasons and value to run this thought
experiment on: legal reasons, reasons of etiquette, and probably others besides.
For PORE to be true, it has to be that all of these cases are ones in which
the reasons would remain unchanged. The argument from chapter 3 already
shows that we should judge the reasons to be different in all of the cases PORE
covers, but defeating the exclusion objection requires only one of the thought
experiments to go that way.
Bringing the test down from the level of generalized value and reasons to
more specific kinds may help make PORE easier to think about, as the more
determinate tests are closer to our everyday thinking about values. Of course,
some might find generalized PORE easy to decide its own. I’ll continue to
speak about the more specific versions of the test to make the discussion a bit
more gripping, but obviously everything said about those will go for PORE
itself. They’re just ways of testing PORE.
Now, even if testing PORE by way of thought experiments on more
determinate kinds of value can make things easier, it still may not be feasible to
decide. Consider the epistemic and aesthetic versions of the test for instance.
I have a justified belief that I’m sitting in front of a computer right now. And
(let’s suppose) the Miles Davis that I’m listening to while I type is a great
work of art. On the one hand there is a pull towards saying that if everything
were held fixed except for the facts that my belief is justified and that Kind
of Blue is a good piece of music, my reasons for believing it and appreciating
the music would stay the same. Why wouldn’t they? I still have all the same
evidence, and the music sounds exactly the same. On the other hand, there’s
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the upshot of chapter 3: if it isn’t valuable in some way, you shouldn’t do
it. And that suggests that if the belief is no longer epistemically good and
the music is no longer aesthetically good, then the situation with my reasons
might well have changed. That doesn’t mean on its own that values aren’t
excluded, but it’s enough to give pause when we think about these cases. The
redundancy argument challenges us to make a seemingly difficult decision here.
That’s why the question of rational exclusion is interesting and philosophically
significant.
There’s a possibility that PORE is not just hard to make up one’s mind
about. It might be impossible to decide, un-evaluable in principle. As we
saw in chapter 4, interpreting the redundancy argument along these lines
might seem uncharitable, effectively suggesting that the argument amounts
to near-nonsense. But as I argued there, it should be clear that PORE
really is evaluable. It’s not logically impossible to hold value-makers fixed
while subtracting value. Since the antecedents in all the counterfactuals we’re
considering are logically possible, there’s no reason to worry that they aren’t
evaluable, even if they are hard to decide on.
Still, the difficulty of assessing PORE and its more specific instances is some
evidence for thinking it’s too far-fetched to make any difference to actual-world
reasons. It may be entirely irrelevant what gives reasons, even if it’s evaluable
in principle. In that case, the second premise of the redundancy argument
would be false.
Consider the counterfactual if modus ponens were invalid, all the logic books
would be false. This strikes me as both non-vacuously true and easy to decide,
but its truth tells us nothing about what kinds of results are derivable from
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modus ponens.2 Maybe PORE is like that. It might be that what’s true or false
at distant worlds that are just like ours but for the existence of value simply
make no difference to what actually favors. Nearly all of the situations we
consider in ordinary normative thinking are ones where supervenience holds.
Think of trolley cases, or cases about what our reasons would be like if x
had happened rather than y. But the worlds we need to evaluate PORE
are ones where supervenience fails, since in all of them we have a difference in
value without a difference in value-makers. It doesn’t seem obviously wrong to
think that because supervenience is a foundational commitment of normative
theorizing, any worlds that violate it are too far removed from the actual world
to matter. And whatever difficulty we might feel in evaluating the relevant
counterfactuals would be nicely explained by the irrelevance of such worlds:
we’re so accustomed to reasoning with supervenience that its failure leaves us
confused.
The concern that some thought experiments are normatively irrelevant
is predictable, and prima facie compelling. An example from Parfit’s On
What Matters can illustrate this. Parfit gives an argument against subjectivist
theories of normative reasons. According to this kind of subjectivism, reasons
are given just by facts about our current desires. This is far too quick a
statement of the view, but the details don’t matter much here.3 Parfit asks
us to imagine people who have no desire to avoid agony. He claims that such
people certainly do have reasons to avoid agony, and subjectivism implies that
they do not. So subjectivism must be false.4
2Adherents of the orthodox semantics for counterfactals will balk here, as
counterpossibles like this one are supposed to come out as vacuously true. For a good
argument that the orthodoxy gets this wrong, see Nolan 1997.
3See Parfit 2011, part I, chapter 3 for more discussion.
4Parfit 2011, p. 76.
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One response to this argument is that Parfit must be wrong because
subjectivism is not a theory about people who are so radically different from
us. The idea here seems to be that if our theories of normative reasons aren’t
meant to apply to people who don’t care about something so fundamentally
bad for us as agony, then Parfit’s argument has committed the fallacy of
irrelevance. The reasons such people would have should make no difference to
the reasons we actually have, or so the objection goes. Parfit seems to take
this sort of response seriously, since the first objection he considers is that the
case is “purely imaginary,” and that “every actual person ... wants to avoid
agony.”5 Whether this objection to Parfit succeeds is indifferent for present
purposes. But the example shows that concerns about irrelevance ought to be
taken seriously.
So, the if-then premise of the redundancy argument is weak because the
truth of PORE may not tell us anything about what actually gives reasons.
But there are also good reasons for thinking that if PORE were relevant, it
would have to be false. We turn now to the principle itself.
5.2 Does favoring drain away?
In this section we’ll unravel PORE by pulling on the very thread it’s made
of. On the assumption that it’s both reasonably evaluable and relevant to
what actually gives reasons, the following problem emerges. If the intuitive
motivation for excluding values—that the value-makers would have been
sufficient on their own—is correct, a regress looms in which favoring powers
are pushed down to the lowest level of ontology. That’s a bad thing, as I’ll
explain.
5Parfit 2011, p. 76.
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In our post-Moore philosophical culture, it’s easy to get into the habit
of thinking that there are just two levels of description needed to do ethics:
there’s the level of goodness and the level of good-makers. And when those
are the only levels that matter, excluding value in favor of its makers can look
like the right choice. Value-makers are normatively efficacious by their very
nature, since they bring about value. So when the makers compete with value
to give reasons, it can seem like good sense to resolve the competition in favor
of the makers—it’s a conceptual truth that the makers have normative powers,
but it’s less clear that values themselves have them.
This story about exclusion might seem like a misrepresentation of Scanlon’s
rationale. He argues, after all, that the best explanation of the openness in
Moore’s open question argument is that although the claim that x is F might
leave it open whether we should draw some conclusion about our practical
reasons, the claim that x is good does not leave it open—if it’s good, we ought
to have pro-attitudes towards it.6 So Scanlon does think that values can help
us find the normative reasons that we have. But being a guide to the existence
of reasons is not the same as having normative powers. Scanlon thinks that
values are indicative of the ability to favor because they are generated by
favoring. That’s not the same thing as having genuine normative powers.
The beginning of the problem for PORE is that exclusion cannot stop
at the level of commonsense value-makers like being pleasant or shedding
light on the causes of cancer without doing so arbitrarily. It wouldn’t be
arbitrary to stop at the level below value if there were only the two levels.
But there’s a lot going on below the level of being pleasant. For each level
of description—psychological, neurological, chemical, physical, etc.—there is
6Scanlon 1998, p. 96.
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a corresponding group of properties on which commonsense value-making
properties supervene, just as value supervenes on the makers. Consider the
reasons given by these commonsense value-makers. To the extent that qualities
like being pleasant, being a belief caused in the appropriate way, maximizing
happiness, or looking like Guernica give reasons, it seems clear that they would
do so in virtue of lower-level qualities. A pleasant resort is desirable because
of its basic physical features like weather and location, an appropriately
caused belief is desirable because there is a truth-conducive physical connection
between the believer and the object of belief, maximizing happiness is desirable
because of the neurological condition that happy people are in, and having
the appearance of Guernica is desirable because of photons entering people’s
eyes and the kind of neurological response they tend to generate. Thus the
higher-level value-makers supervene on lower-level makers, and there is reason
to suspect that these lower-level makers are sufficient on their own to generate
all the reasons we have.
As we saw in chapter 4, supervenience of powers and a presumption of
sufficiency are all we need to generate an exclusion argument. So if the
exclusion thought behind PORE works the way it’s supposed to, it should
also work for the conclusion that higher-level value-makers are excluded in
favor of the lower-level makers. Exclusion operates on the idea that when
two different levels related by supervenience are sufficient to produce the same
outcome, the competition between them should be resolved in favor of the
lower-level thing. Again, when we’re only thinking of two levels, we’ve got no
choice but to stop after one iteration of the exclusion argument. But when
there are many levels, it’s arbitrary to stop after just one level—you have to
ride the elevator all the way to the bottom, so to speak. In other words, either
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you grant powers to the top level or you give them to the lowest. There is no
tenable middle ground.
The idea that exclusion must run all the way down to the bottom level
comes from Ned Block, who invoked it to combat Kim’s causal exclusion
argument against non-reductive physicalism about the mind.7 Block argues
that if the mental is excluded from having causal powers because its
neurological supervenience base is already sufficient, then the neurological is
excluded in favor of its chemical supervenience base, and so on down to the
lowest level of physics. Block goes on to suggest that there may be no bottom
level of physics. It might be turtles all the way down.8 And if that’s the case,
then causal powers drain away in a regress that never stops, which means that
nothing really has causal powers. That’s a bad result for fans of the causal
exclusion argument.
The present argument against PORE adapts Block’s rationale to normative
reasons, but it differs from his argument in one important way. Block’s
conclusion that causal powers drain away into nothing works only to the
extent that it’s likely that physics has no bottom level. It’s possible to run
the argument that favoring powers drain away with this same premise, arguing
that if there’s no bottom level of physics then nothing can give reasons because
favoring powers will be stuck in the same regress as causal powers. But the “no
lowest level” premise is making a substantial assumption, which is subject to
empirical confirmation. If it turns out that physics really does have a bottom
level, then Block’s argument is no good. This is where our argument against
PORE departs from Block’s: it doesn’t need any claims about whether or
not there is a lowest level of physics. Because favoring can’t happen below a
7Block 2003.
8Because of a promise I made to Matt Koehler, let’s stipulate that these are ninja turtles.
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certain threshold, and because the regress will push the eligible considerations
below it, there wouldn’t be any normative reasons at all. Hence, if PORE is
true, favoring might just drain away.
Before we detail how that happens, there are a couple of issues to mention.
The first is a reminder that thinking of higher-level properties as identical with
constellations of lower-level properties is perfectly fine for our purposes, but
it won’t help the PORE out of the regress problem. That’s because PORE
is concerned with considerations, which are facts or true propositions, rather
than properties. As we saw in chapter 4, even if the properties being Lumpl and
being Goliath are identical, that doesn’t mean that considerations about Lumpl
and Goliath give reasons equally. That some statue is Goliath could plausibly
be taken to give reasons for displaying and preserving it, which the fact that
some bit of clay is Lumpl would not plausibly give. Generally speaking, it
seems that considerations count in favor de dicto, rather than de re.
For example, if I’m Lex Luthor and I want to kill Superman, the fact
that Clark Kent works at the Daily Planet doesn’t seem to favor any course
of action for me unless I also know that Clark is Superman. So even if
higher-level value-makers are identical in some way to lower-level makers,
that shouldn’t make any difference to whether the higher-level makers can
be excluded. Reason-giving powers can’t be inherited just by dint of identity.
Just as people worried about epiphenomenalism were concerned about whether
our actions are caused in virtue of the mental qualities of our brain states or
whether they’re caused in virtue of their physical qualities—even if the relevant
physical and mental states are identical—so too does it seem that it wouldn’t
matter if value facts and value-maker facts were really the same. If PORE is
true, then facts favor in virtue of their value-making qualities, not their value
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qualities.9
The other thing to mention is that it’s unlikely that Scanlon, or anyone
else who accepts the redundancy argument, meant for the exclusion thought
to be iterated into a regress. Indeed, since the publication of the original
redundancy argument Scanlon has said that lower-level evaluative properties
like wrongness do in fact give reasons.10 Now, it’s unclear what this means.
Scanlon is of course entitled to the positive view that lower-level evaluative
properties do give reasons, but it’s far from clear that he can hold this view
while embracing rational exclusion at the same time, as we saw in chapter
2. So as Roger Crisp points out, this may be a change to Scanlon’s original
view, or it may not be.11 If Scanlon is giving up the redundancy argument,
then a lot of the wind goes out of its sail. But if not, then stopping the buck
anywhere between the top level and the bottom level is unacceptably arbitrary
in the absence of a good reason to do so. This would be the case regardless
of whether the buck stopped at lower-level evaluative properties, high-level
natural properties, or mid-level natural properties. I mention this only to
make it clear that drainage of favoring powers isn’t a feature of PORE, it’s a
bug.
With those things in mind, it’s time to put the argument into sharper
focus. The basic claim is that if PORE is true and relevant to what actually
gives reasons, then the line of reasoning that excludes values must also exclude
everything down lowest, most determinate level of physical description. Here
are a few examples of how that happens, utilizing the specific applications of
PORE that I described above.
9For a quick history of how this came to be the exclusion thought, see Fodor 1989.
10Scanlon 2002, p. 513.
11Crisp 2005, p. 83 n. 6.
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• Aesthetic drainage
Suppose we took considerations of beauty to give reasons. Aesthetic
PORE says that if we subtracted aesthetic values from the world but
fixed everything else we logically can, there would be no change in our
aesthetic reasons. So at best, higher-level aesthetic good-makers, like
looking like Guernica are what give the reasons. But those higher-level
makers have mid-level makers, like being this arrangement of paint on
canvas. Once exclusion is allowed, there’s nothing to stop us applying
a version of PORE for higher-level aesthetic good-makers such that if
we subtracted everything down to and including that level while holding
fixed everything else, our aesthetic reasons would stay the same. The
same will go for arrangements of paint. If the higher-level makers would
have been sufficient, then so should the middle and lower-level ones. We
can continue to apply this procedure until we’ve excluded everything but
constellations of the most basic properties of paintings there are.
• Moral drainage
Moral PORE prevents moral values like wrongness from giving reasons
because there are moral value-makers, like non-compliance with the
Categorical Imperative (CI), that are presumed to be sufficient to
generate all the moral reasons we have. But of course, non-compliance
with the CI has its own makers, something along the lines of being in a
particular type of neurological state. Taking away everything down to
the neurological level while holding the rest constant would presumably
leave us with the same reasons too. So compliance can’t be what favors
either. Again, we can repeat this inference for successively lower levels
until we reach the bottom.
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• Epistemic drainage
Reasons for and against believing things have to come from somewhere,
but if Epistemic PORE is right, then they won’t come from an epistemic
value like justification. At best they’ll have to come from a maker of
justification, like being causally connected with the object of belief in the
appropriate way. That connection will itself have makers at lower levels
in increasingly determinate relations among properties and objects. So
if PORE works against justification, similar thoughts will work against
causal connections and the less determinate relations that make for those
connections.
• Prudential drainage
Prudential goodness and badness are excluded by PORE in favor of
lower-level properties like being the more efficient option to one’s ends,
since they are thought as sufficient on their own. And as in the other
cases, efficiency is realized by more complex lower level properties. In this
case, those realizers will be a hyper-determinate combination of logical
and causal relations. Once exclusion gets started, the only things left to
give prudential reasons are these maximally basic properties.
• Comedic drainage
Applied to comedy, PORE tells us that the reasons we have to laugh at
jokes are already accounted for by properties that are of a lower level than
being funny or falling flat. You might think that something like being a
clever pun would suffice. But there’s nothing to stop us presuming that
properties that the sub-vening properties that make for cleverness would
also be sufficient, thus excluding even cleverness, etc., until we reach
basic facts about how the brain interprets things that are communicated
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to us.
Hopefully these examples are enough to illustrate how good-makers of every
kind are vulnerable to drainage of favoring powers, by virtue of the fact
that they all have their own realizers. Since the mechanism of exclusion is
a presumption that realizers would be sufficient on their own, this will extend
all the way down until we reach a level where there are no more realizers.
The only way out of the regress is to find a point where certain upper-level
good-makers would be sufficient on their own, but the realization base at the
next level down would not be. If that were the case, then favoring powers
wouldn’t drain all the way down to the lowest level because the train of
exclusion would stop once it reaches a point where lower levels are no longer
sufficient.
As we saw above, Scanlon explains Moore’s open question argument as
follows. While it can be an open question whether the possession of certain
value-making properties ensures that there are reasons in the vicinity, the
possession of value itself never leaves that question open. It can be tempting
to think something like this will do the trick to stop rational drainage: if
some group of higher-level value makers settled the question of whether there
are reasons towards the things that have them, but lower-level makers left
the question open, that offers a natural breaking point to stop the iteration of
exclusion. The thought would be that the higher-level properties are obviously
sufficient to generate the reasons we have, but the lower-level ones are not.
Exclusion arguments break down once the supervenience base is no longer
sufficient on its own to generate the outcome in question.
The trouble with appealing to open question considerations to stop
drainage in this way is that leaving the question of whether there are reasons
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in the vicinity of some property open doesn’t mean that the property is
insufficient on its own to generate those reasons. Which questions are open
and which one’s aren’t is a matter of conceptual necessity, but the reason
some consideration gives need not be conceptually necessary. Scanlon’s own
example can illustrate this. The property of being pleasant leaves the question
open according to Scanlon, but it’s still sufficient to generate reasons in
his view.12 Scanlon’s later claim that pleasantness is really a lower-level
evaluative property complicates things, but the general point stands. Even if
being pleasant also settled the question conceptually, that should not stop the
realizers of pleasantness from being sufficient to give reasons with something
less than conceptual strength. So an open question argument won’t do to stop
favoring powers from draining all the way down.
Another way to stop the regress might be to use the threshold of
psychologically possible motivation, of the kind we saw in chapter 3. If reasons
were given just by properties at the lowest level we can appreciate, then they
wouldn’t be in danger of draining away into nothing. There are a couple of
things to say about this strategy. The first is that we need a substantive
proposal about where this border is in the spectrum of levels. Since claims
of psychological possibility can’t be made universally, there may be no clear
line of division between what’s possible and what isn’t. Without a firm line
of demarcation it could be possible to run exclusion arguments on pairs of
properties at adjacent levels, and push the regress through to the other side,
as in a sorites series. And even if the regress can’t be pushed through in this
way, the potential vagueness of the border would leave us with no clear sense
of which properties are the genuine reason-givers, and our ability to act on the
12Scanlon 1998, p. 96.
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right reasons would still be hampered. So an objectionable kind of rational
drainage would nevertheless occur.
The second response to this move is that psychological possibility doesn’t
seem to capture the intuitive thought behind PORE. Exclusion gets going on
the idea that as long as some set of properties is materially sufficient to give the
result we want, they get the powers in question. No appeal to psychological
possibility is needed, and Scanlon certainly doesn’t make any. One of the
chief concerns about the redundancy argument is that it runs together the
metaphysical explanation of how reasons occur with the normative story of
why those reasons are reasons. It’s true that the lowest level of ontology is
sufficient to produce all our reasons, and insofar as that’s the ticket to giving
reasons, the regress should continue.
On its own, the idea that all the favoring is done at the lowest level
of description might look attractive to those who appreciate hard-headed
scientific realism. This is a sort of normative analogue to nihilism about
composite material objects. Where nihilism claims that only the most basic
things do the existing, this is the claim that only the most basic considerations
do the reason-giving. But this is just the first half of the problem for PORE.
The criticism of PORE is not just that reason-giving powers drain down, it’s
that they drain away. That is, they disappear. And that should be much less
palatable to anyone who’s sympathetic with normative realism.
If favoring powers drain down to the lowest level, then the considerations
that actually favor in the end will be hyper-determinate and maximally
complex. In many cases they will be considerations about arrangements of
sub-atomic particles, quantum field states, and the laws that govern their
interaction. More specifically, they will be propositions quantifying over vast
107
numbers of things and involving more than a few relations. Think of a
proposition like <there is an x, a y, and a z, such that Fx, Gy, and ¬Gz,
and Rxz and ¬Ryz, or there is an x1 such that Syx1>. That’s already
complicated enough for most of us, even when the predicate symbols mean
something ordinary and accessible. Now imagine a proposition like this where
the predicate meanings are supplied by the most fundamental particle physics
we have, and which has millions more argument places. That might sound
a bit overdramatic, but that’s quite literally the sort of proposition that we
should expect to find at the bottom level.
Most of us, and more likely all of us, lack the brain power to fully
consider such a proposition, even if we understand the relevant physics. These
considerations are simply unappreciable for beings like us. And that means
it’s not psychologically possible for us to be motivated by them in the sense
I introduced back in chapter 3. There, I defended what I called Motivational
Ought Implies Can (or MOIC) by appealing to the idea that if considerations
that aren’t possible motivators could give ultimate reasons, then ethics would
no longer be in the business of guiding actions for beings like us. Instead, ethics
would be action-guiding primarily for ideal people who are a lot smarter than
us.
Now consider a simple extension of MOIC, that every normative reason is a
possible motivator. If the regress works and everything up to the lowest level is
excluded from giving reasons, and if this more general version of MOIC is true,
then nothing gives reasons at all. The train of exclusion reasoning places a
constraint on reasons such that they can only be considerations at the bottom
level, and our Ought Implies Can principle generates a different constraint
restricting reasons to what’s motivationally possible. But no consideration
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can satisfy both constraints. Thus reason-giving powers have drained away
into nothing. So no one who believes in normative reasons can accept both
generalized MOIC and PORE.
Now, PORE is part objection to the value-first view, and MOIC is a premise
in the argument for that view. Adherents of PORE will have to deny a premise
from that argument, and they are free to chose MOIC as the one to give up.
Still, it’s safe to deny MOIC and allow that even if the rational ought doesn’t
always imply can, most of us still can be motivated by most of the things
we should be. If bottom-level considerations gave all the reasons, then we
can almost never be motivated by the things we should be because they’re all
too complex to appreciate. If we are nearly universally unable to act for the
genuine reasons we have, then not only does ethics better serve some ideal
class of smarter people, it can only serve such people—it will never be action
guiding for the vast majority of us. I think that’s just too implausible to
accept.
Here’s the other side of that coin, which is not as damning, but still
unpalatable. If bottom-level considerations were the only things that gave
reasons, then in addition to turning the truths of ethics into unappreciable
gibberish for us, it also turns out that all our everyday claims about the
reasons we have false. To say that the resort’s pleasantness gives me a reason
to go there would not merely be to say something strictly false but in the
neighborhood of the truth. It would be to say something so far removed
from the truth that “pleasantness” is not plausibly shorthand for the more
complicated thing we really mean. We can’t mean the more complicated thing
at all.
So even if MOIC is false, favoring still drains away into nothing if the
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thought behind PORE is true. If we’re faced with a choice between giving up
on reasons altogether and giving up on exclusion, the sensible option has to
be giving up on exclusion. In other words, we should say that PORE and its
more specific instances are false—value-makers are not sufficient on their own
to generate the reasons we have.
This concludes the defense against Scanlon’s redundancy argument. If
value doesn’t give reasons, then it certainly doesn’t give ultimate reasons, and
the value-first view would be false. But as we’ve seen in this chapter, both
premises of the redundancy argument are suspect. Redundancy is surely not
the only objection to the value-first view, but it’s definitely the most commonly
accepted. Undermining this worry places the value-first view on much surer
footing.
To close out the dissertation, we’ll now turn to another powerful
objection—this time against MOIC.
110
Chapter 6
Giving Up Hume’s Guillotine
In chapter 3 I claimed that we needn’t worry about any challenges to the
principle that ought implies can from Hume’s view that you can’t get an ought
from an is, because Hume’s idea should be dispensed with. In this chapter
I make good on that claim by making a point about the difference between
truth and relevance.1
Hume’s Guillotine rests on a distinction between normative and descriptive
sentences.2 This is because Hume’s Guillotine is an inference barrier, and
inferences deal in sentences. So, to say that you can’t get an ‘ought’ from an
‘is’ is really to say that you can’t validly infer any normative sentences from any
descriptive ones. Though it was long out of favor, the Guillotine has enjoyed
a resurgence among technically-minded philosophers who hope to prove that
some version of it is true and silence the doubters. Proving something in a
formal language is not enough to vindicate the principle, though. To be a bona
1An earlier and slightly different version of this chapter is forthcoming in Australasian
Journal of Philosophy. Thanks to Taylor and Francis Publishing for generous author’s
rights.
2Hume’s Guillotine is known by many other names. I borrow this more vivid label from
Max Black 1964.
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fide Hume’s Guillotine, a principle must be a guide for ethics as we actually
do it in natural languages. That is, it needs to govern real-life normative
assertion. I suggest this as a criterion of success on any attempt to defend
the view. Without this kind of relevance, there is little reason to care about
Hume’s Guillotine.
Because of powerful counterexamples from A.N. Prior, anyone defending
the Guillotine must give an account of which sentences are normative and
which are descriptive. Getting this right is crucial. It’s one thing to prove a
result in a language, and it’s quite another to prove a result in one that can
serve as an appropriate meta-language for the ethics we actually do.
I’ll argue that the prospects for proving an acceptable version of Hume’s
Guillotine are dim, because the maneuvering required to secure a true principle
alienates it from real-life normative assertion. This is a reason to think the
effort to defend the Guillotine with formal methods is failing. That project
may ultimately succeed, but too little attention goes to creating an adequate
model of ethics. I hope to show the cost of that neglect.
In what follows I’ll show that each successful strategy for beating
Prior’s counterexamples involves a faulty distinction between normative and
descriptive sentences. Irrelevance across the wide range of views strongly
suggests that the problem lies with the distinction between sentences. Some
perfectly natural distinctions may not be clean enough for philosophical use,
so choosing the right distinction to stake a claim on makes all the difference.
Many have argued that the Guillotine is problematic and said no more.
I want to make the additional point that much of what’s desirable in it
can be had at the level of words rather than sentences: no descriptive
terms are synonymous with any normative terms. Call this view Moore’s
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Law because of its connection with the naturalistic fallacy. The problems
for Hume’s Guillotine arise because it’s an inference barrier and therefore
requires a clear distinction between sentences. Moore’s Law separates the
normative from the descriptive without needing that. The inference barrier is
replaced by a semantic one, and a term-level distinction takes the place of the
sentence-level one. Insofar as it’s worth having a methodological constraint
like the Guillotine, Moore’s Law offers a nice replacement.
Given how often the Guillotine is invoked, it’s clear that many do want
such a rule for ethics. But if what I argue is right, those of us who treat
the Guillotine as philosophically secure way to correct students and rebuke
opponents will have to think again. Those who have hoped to get even more
mileage out it by enlisting it to show some further result will have to re-work
their arguments.3 The good news for all of us is that Moore’s Law can deliver
these goods as well.
The specific kind of relevance I’m after is this: a guiding principle like
the Guillotine should be a rule for a game that people are really playing.
An inference barrier couched in a language we’re not speaking is no more
significant than a barrier to inferences we’re not making, and a false principle
governs nothing. Since the versions of the Guillotine on offer require faulty
ideas about what counts as normative, they’re rules for the wrong game.
My concern with relevance is not the only one out there, however.
Gerhard Schurz and Charles Pigden have engaged in a dispute over
whether or not Hume’s Guillotine is relevant in the sense of having other
metaethical implications, particularly whether or not it implies anything
3Sinnott-Armstrong 2000, and Huemer 2005 invoke the Guillotine to defend views about
moral epistemology, for example.
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about non-cognitivism or naturalism.4 This is a different question. Someone
like Pigden who believes that it’s metaethically neutral could also believe
consistently that it’s a guiding rule for ethics and ethical inferences. Pigden
suggests he does think this when he says that people trying to infer normative
conclusions from descriptive premises are making a significant mistake.5 So
metaethical relevance is not the same thing as first-order ethical relevance.
Although I doubt that the sentence-level distinction can be made well
enough to deliver a relevant version of the Guillotine, I think there is a real
difference and that some sentences are clearly normative or descriptive. That’s
compatible with thinking that explaining the difference is hard to do, and
it’s also consistent with allowing difficult borderline cases. Indeed, the basic
problem that motivates the views we’ll see below is brought out by such a case.
In the next section, I’ll explain the dilemma for Hume’s Guillotine that
forces its defenders to give specific accounts of normative sentences. In sections
three through five, I argue that efforts to frame an inference barrier around
these accounts fail to produce a suitable version of the view. I conclude in
section six by outlining how Moore’s Law can stand in for the Guillotine, and
offer at least one improvement on it. Just so, Moore’s Law is well-positioned
to be the guiding principle we wanted.
6.1 Prior’s dilemma
A.N. Prior thought he could show Hume’s Guillotine was false in a way that
most other attempts could not. A popular strategy for arguing against the
view went like this: identify a normative sentence, then argue that it follows
4See Pigden 2010b, ch. 6.
5Pigden 2010a, p. 26.
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from some set of descriptive sentences. This was John Searle’s approach
in his example where Jones promises to to pay Smith five dollars.6 From
the descriptive premise that Jones uttered the words of the promise we can
supposedly infer the normative conclusion that Jones must pay Smith five
dollars. A cost of this strategy is that its success depends on whether the
sentences really are normative and descriptive as alleged, and critics of Searle
were quick to point this out. Prior’s argument is especially powerful because
it doesn’t require consensus on which its crucial sentence is.
Start by considering this basic statement of the Guillotine.
Naïve HG: There are no satisfiable valid arguments from descriptive premises
to normative conclusions.7
The argument against Naïve HG then goes as follows.8 Take the valid
argument, A.
(A-i) Tea-drinking is common in England.
∴(A-ii) Either tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders ought
to be shot.
The premise of A is descriptive, so if the conclusion is normative then Naïve
HG is false. But since it need not be true that all New Zealanders ought to
be shot for (A-ii) to be true, one might suspect it’s not normative. Suppose
then that it’s descriptive, and consider a second valid argument, B.
(B-i) It’s not the case that tea-drinking is common in England.
6Searle 1964. Other instances of the strategy can be found in Max Black 1964,
Hector-Neri Castañeda 1973, and Peter Geach 1977.
7Being satisfiable means the premises are consistent. After all, anything follows from a
contradiction.
8Prior 1960.
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(B-ii) Either tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders ought
to be shot.
∴(B-iii) All New Zealanders ought to be shot.
Again, the premise is clearly descriptive. And plausibly, the tea-drinking
disjunction must be either normative or descriptive. If we say it’s normative,
then argument A is a counterexample to Naïve HG. But if we say it’s
descriptive, then B is a counterexample. Hence the dilemma.
The challenge for defenders of Hume’s Guillotine is to get around Prior’s
dilemma. By my count, there are three ways of doing this.
(1) Accept that A is a valid is-ought inference, but replace Naïve HG with
something that doesn’t apply to A (the term approach).
(2) Call the tea-drinking disjunction normative as a premise but descriptive
as a conclusion (the relativity approach).
(3) Say that the tea-drinking sentence is neither normative nor descriptive
(the fragility approach).
I’ll discuss these strategies in order below.
6.2 First approach: terms
Normative sentences might be distinguished from descriptive ones by their
terms. Most words are clearly one or the other. On this strategy, a sentence
is normative just in case it contains a normative term, like ‘ought’, ‘should’,
‘may’, ‘good’, ‘right’, and ‘wrong’, and descriptive just in case it doesn’t. Call
this the term approach to normative sentences.
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The term approach handles the B-argument of Prior’s dilemma where the
disjunction is a premise, because it has an ‘ought’. But it doesn’t block the
A-argument where the disjunction is the conclusion, since its premise has no
normative terms. Yet Frank Jackson observes that there is something odd
about the A-argument: the ‘ought to be shot’ in the conclusion is replaceable
by any grammatical expression whatsoever—‘are friendly’ or ‘prefer rugby to
curling’—and the argument remains valid, since it’s an instance of the rule of
addition. Call a term in an argument vacuous just in case each occurrence
is uniformly replaceable without prejudice to the inference’s validity.9 This
insight gives way to a version of Hume’s Guillotine that avoids the looming
counterexample.
Jackson’s principle rules out any argument with vacuous terms from the
scope of the view.
JHG: No argument from premises lacking normative terms to a conclusion
with normative terms is valid, unless one of its terms is vacuous.10
Prior’s A-argument is no counterexample to this version of Hume’s Guillotine,
since the ‘ought’ of the tea-drinking disjunction is vacuous. But the restriction
against any vacuous term goes too far. Jackson’s principle places any argument
that is valid in virtue of its logical form outside of its scope. Think of modus
ponens for example: in an inference of the form if p then q, p; therefore q both
p and q are vacuous. Thus the only arguments to which JHG properly applies
are those that are valid just in virtue of the meaning of their terms.11
It’s not difficult to see why this goes too far. Philosophical ethics is in the
business of giving formally valid arguments, as well as informal ones. So if JHG
9c.f. Pigden 1989, p. 134.
10Jackson 1974, p. 93.
11See Jackson 1974, p. 91.
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has nothing to say about arguments that follow modus ponens, disjunctive
syllogism, etc., then it cannot be a guiding principle of ethics as we actually
do it.
Charles Pigden extends Jackson’s strategy by framing a version of the
Guillotine around vacuity, but only when it occurs in the conclusion. Roughly,
Pigden’s says:
PHG: No argument from premises lacking normative terms to a conclusion
with normative terms is valid, unless the normative terms in the
conclusion appear vacuously.
One immediate concern about PHG (that also affects JHG) is that it’s
under-specified—it fails to distinguish use from mention. A sentence might
contain a term in either way, so the term approach really covers two distinct
ideas. There is a narrow claim which says that a sentence is normative just
in case it uses a normative term, and a wide one which says that a sentence
is normative just in case it uses or mentions a normative term. I’ll tackle the
narrow version first.
NHG: No argument from premises not using normative terms to a
conclusion that uses normative terms is valid, unless the normative
terms in the conclusion appear vacuously.
I believe this is what Pigden had in mind. Pigden does not explicitly
consider the use-mention distinction, but he speaks of predicates occurring,
not individual constants, so it’s safe to assume this is the principle he would
choose.12
12Pigden 1989, p. 136.
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The trouble with NHG is that while it avoids Prior’s dilemma, it’s
susceptible to another kind of counterexample. To see how the example works,
consider this wholly descriptive argument.
(C-i) ‘Clark Kent’ names the reporter from Krypton who writes for the Daily
Planet.
∴(C-ii) Clark Kent writes for The Daily Planet.
Argument C is truth-functionally valid in the sense that the truth of the
premise guarantees the truth of the conclusion. It’s not formally valid, but
restricting the Guillotine to just formally valid arguments won’t do, as we’ve
seen. And although the conclusion may not be derivable by syntactic inference
rules, it does clearly follow from the naming convention established by the
premise. Once it’s established, we are licensed to use the name. Furthermore,
‘Clark Kent’ is clearly non-vacuous. Replacing the conclusion with ‘Lois Lane
writes for the The Daily Planet’ would invalidate the argument. Now consider
argument D, which trades on the same kind of inference.
(D-i) ‘Ought to’ names the relation that holds between Lois and the
action-type donate to charity.
∴(D-ii) Lois ought to donate to charity.
If you’re thinking that the premise of this argument is normative, I’m inclined
to agree. It’s just a roundabout way of saying that Lois ought to donate to
charity. Absent a particular view about makes for a normative sentence, the
D-argument is not an especially strong candidate for an is-ought derivation.13
But responding to Prior’s dilemma requires particular criteria for normative
sentences because Naïve HG looks false. For NHG, it’s the narrow term
13I imagine this is why no one else I know of has tried this sort of counterexample.
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approach. It says (D-i) is descriptive, (D-ii) is normative, and the ‘ought’ in
the conclusion is non-vacuous. So D is a counterexample to NHG, provided the
argument is valid. And as C shows, it’s not a contrived one-off argument either.
It’s not hard to imagine genuine instances of this kind of reasoning. Perhaps
an enemy of Superman has obtained a government list of known superhero
identities, hoping to threaten those Superman cares about. Or perhaps a
powerful computer had generated a list of possible actions for Lois that carry
extremely high expected utility, but due to limitations in the programming
language, results are given metalinguistically. Given the information in the
premise the inference to the conclusion is an easy one, but that doesn’t make
D any less of a counterexample.
Defenders of Pigden will be quick to point out that he has given a proof,
so there must be something amiss with the counterexample. But the trouble
really lies with his proof. The problem is that it can’t show NHG because it
fails to distinguish use from mention. Pigden hopes to prove that a predicate
“cannot occur non-vacuously in the conclusion of a valid inference unless it
appears among the premises.”14 Again, predicates can occur in both ways.
Argument D reveals that the proof shows at most that a predicate cannot be
used in the conclusion of a valid argument unless it is used or mentioned. But
that’s not the same as demonstrating NHG, that’s showing something about
the wide term view, which is weaker—the disjunction is crucial.
Objectors might try another response. In a recent commentary on
different counterexamples—which infer normative conclusions from descriptive
premises by claiming some group of sentences is true and including some
normative-looking sentence among them—Pigden objects that,
14Pigden 1989, p. 136.
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“Both...can be accused of concealing the moral content of one of
their premises behind the truth predicate.”15
Likewise, I can be accused of concealing the moral content of the premise in the
D-argument behind the naming convention it establishes, and I readily admit
that I have. The question is whether my bit of linguistic trickery makes a
difference to NHG. In his commentary, Pigden speaks of a distinction between
“formally” moral and “substantively” moral sentences.16 Some may therefore
object that even if the premise of D is formally descriptive by the rules of
NHG, it is nonetheless substantially normative and so fails to undermine the
spirit of the Guillotine.
Yet this sort of objection gets things backwards. Adherents of strategy
1 for combating Prior’s dilemma are not entitled to fall back on some more
general or “substantial” version of the view if the formal candidate fails. Since
the predicate approach allows Prior’s tea-drinking disjunction as normative,
Naïve HG is false by its lights. It’s this trouble with the naïve claim that forces
defenders of the Guillotine to come up with something more sophisticated. If
one of the sophisticated principles succeeds, that just is the substantial view.
If it fails, it’s time to go back to the drawing board, since there is nothing
defensible to fall back on. Those who want to defend Hume’s Guillotine cannot
have it both ways. Either the replacement for Naïve HG is the genuine article,
or it isn’t.
The D-argument also undermines Schurz’s defense of the Guillotine, which
categorizes sentences as either purely normative, purely descriptive, or mixed.
Because he wants to prove versions of it for a range of deontic logics, Schurz
identifies sentences by deontic operators rather than logical constants, but the
15Pigden 2010a, p. 36.
16Pigden 2010a, pp. 34-38.
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basic approach is the same as Pigden and Jackson’s: the words themselves
make difference. A sentence is purely normative just when the entire thing
lies inside the scope of a normative operator, purely descriptive just when
there is no use of a normative operator, and mixed just when the operator
binds only part of the sentence.17 So a sentence like ‘Lois ought to donate to
charity’ will be purely normative, and a sentence like ‘snow is white’ will be
purely descriptive. Because only its right-hand disjunct is in the scope of a
normative operator, Prior’s tea-drinking disjunction comes out mixed.
Given these categories, there are three possibilities for a valid is-ought
inference. We might have (a) a purely descriptive to mixed (like Prior’s
A-argument where the disjunction is the conclusion), (b) mixed to purely
normative (like Prior’s B-argument where the disjunction is a premise), or
(c) purely descriptive premises to purely normative. Schurz appears to think
others have proved that no non-trivial type (c) arguments are valid, so he
leaves this possibility out and focuses on blocking types (a) and (b).18
But ignoring (c) is a mistake—the D-argument constitutes a valid instance
by Schurz’s lights. The naming convention for Lois given by the premise must
be interpreted as purely descriptive here. Although there is a mention of
‘ought’ and operators are defined syntactically, it can hardly be thought of as
an active normative operator. Trying to interpret the premise that way leads
to nonsense, since there would be no grammatical sentence left to operate on
(‘O’ stands for the operator, with the sentence it binds in brackets):
O[names the relation between Lois and the action-type donate to charity]
This is not a formula of any language. It’s a misuse of the sentential operator,
so clearly it won’t do. The premise is therefore purely descriptive. And the
17Schurz 2010, pp. 200-201.
18See Schurz 2010, p. 204, and Schurz 1997, ch. 3.3 for discussion.
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conclusion is purely normative, since there is an active normative operator
binding the whole sentence:
O[Lois donates to charity]
So although Schurz’s view differs from NHG, it fails for the same reasons.
The failure of the narrow approach drives us to the wide one. It has no
trouble handling the D-argument because it designates any premise that uses
or mentions a normative term as a normative sentence. Applying it to Pigden’s
PHG gives us:
WHG: No argument from premises that do not use or mention normative
terms to a conclusion that uses or mentions normative terms
is valid, unless the normative terms in the conclusion appear
vacuously.
This principle is much more secure: the D-argument can’t be a counterexample
because it mentions ‘ought’, and Pigden has a proof of it. The issue with WHG
is not falsity, but irrelevance. If WHG is going to be the Guillotine, wide term
approach to normative sentences needs to be adequate. But consider:
(5L) The word ‘ought’ has five letters in it.
The wide approach incorrectly calls this a normative sentence. WHG is true,
but pairing it with the wide approach means it’s a Guillotine for a language no
one speaks. In English, 5L is just a piece of orthography—even if it’s normative
in some sense, it’s not the sort of moral claim that’s relevant here. If merely
describing a norm like the spelling of ‘ought’ makes a sentence normative for
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the purposes of the Guillotine, then Prior’s dilemma wouldn’t have been a
problem in the first place, since the tea-drinking claim describes a norm too.
Some might counter that admitting too much into the set of normative
sentences isn’t a problem. As long as WHG governs all the sentences we need
it to, maybe it’s acceptable for it to govern some that weren’t intended. I agree
that it’s not a problem if there’s reason to group the unintended cases with the
original ones. To draw an analogy, it doesn’t count against laws meant regulate
telegraph transmissions that they also rule over telephone and internet traffic.
But in this case there are good reasons against grouping sentences like 5L with
the normative ones. Grammar and linguistics are not ethics, nor anything like
it. To see this, notice that being a skeptic about ethics gives us no reason to
doubt grammar.
So, neither version of the term approach delivers Hume’s Guillotine.
6.3 Second approach: relativity
A different approach to Prior’s dilemma is to deny that either of his arguments
can be sound counterexamples. Toomas Karmo suggests that a sentence is
normative or descriptive relative to a world. Worlds are composed of three
maximal consistent sets: a set of obviously normative sentences (like ‘Lois
ought to donate to charity’), a set of obviously descriptive ones (like ‘snow is
white’), and a set of non-obvious sentences (like ‘snow is white or Lois ought to
donate to charity’). A non-obvious sentence is normative just in case changing
the truth-value of some obviously normative one, while holding the obviously
descriptive ones fixed, changes its truth-value. So, for a non-obvious case like
‘snow is white or Lois ought to donate to charity’, its status will depend on
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the world of evaluation. If snow is actually white, then varying obviously
normative sentences won’t change the truth-value because the first disjunct is
fixed. But if snow isn’t white at the world of evaluation, then the truth-value
depends on the obviously normative sentences because the second disjunct is
in that set. Call this the relativity approach to normative sentences.19
This view allows Karmo to prove a candidate for the Guillotine that avoids
Prior’s dilemma.
KHG: There is no argument whose premises are descriptive and whose
conclusion is normative, relative to worlds where it’s sound.20
Given the relativity approach, KHG avoids Prior’s dilemma because the crucial
tea-drinking disjunction varies between the two arguments. It’s descriptive as
the conclusion of A because its truth is preserved by the premise: it’s true
regardless of what ought to happen to New Zealanders. As a premise in B
it’s normative. Its truth depends on normative facts about Kiwis because B
is sound only if tea-drinking is scarce.
Some normative-sounding assertions create a problem for the relativity
approach. Consider the following:
(BILL) Bill was right to tell the truth about Monica.
To know whether BILL is normative or descriptive, we need to specify a world.
Start with a world where Bill lies.
19Karmo’s view draws on I.L. Humberstone 1982, which is inspired in turn by J.M.
Shorter’s 1961 reply to Prior.
20Karmo 1988, p. 256, c.f. Humberstone 1982.
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Since BILL is a factive claim about satisfying a norm, it’s equivalent to
a conjunction: Bill told the truth about Monica and Bill ought to tell the
truth about Monica. We’ll run Karmo’s test on this for simplicity. If varying
an obviously descriptive sentence while fixing the descriptive ones forces it to
change truth-value, we know it’s normative. But since its first conjunct is
descriptive and false, that won’t happen. The conjunction is descriptive when
Bill lies, so BILL is too.
That BILL is descriptive at any world where he lies already invites a
charge of irrelevance because it means KHG is a rule for the wrong object
language. It leaves out sentences that should be in the scope of the view. And
the divergence from natural language gets worse. Notice that while BILL is
descriptive at the actual world, it is normative according to the view at any
world where Bill does tell the truth. Then consider:
(BILL*) Bill was right not to tell the truth about Monica.
Parallel reasons show BILL* is normative anywhere Bill doesn’t tell the truth.
But there is no normatively significant difference between the two—each makes
a clear moral evaluation. The only difference is that at some worlds the
sentences correctly describe Bill’s action and in others they don’t.21 Yet it’s
difficult to see how this would be relevant to assessing normativity. If it isn’t
relevant, Karmo’s approach doesn’t accurately model natural language.
Some might argue that correctly describing Bill’s action is normatively
21I’ve heard it suggested that sentences with presupposition failure lack truth-values. I
am skeptical that this is the case with BILL, but responding this way won’t help HGK.
First, if BILL has no truth-value, it cannot be normative on Karmo’s definition. Second,
since BILL appears to imply truth-apt sentences like ’Bill told the truth’, there’s a further
problem of explaining how we can get a sentence with a truth-value out of one without.
People interested in putting up inference barriers might not want to allow this. Thanks to
an anonymous referee for the second point.
126
relevant by comparing these cases with Prior’s disjunction. Because the
disjunction is descriptive according to the view when it describes the facts
about tea-drinking correctly and normative when it doesn’t, it gets a mixed
treatment, like BILL and BILL*. If it’s acceptable for Prior’s disjunction to
vary with correctness, then perhaps it really is relevant to whether a sentence
is normative.
Yet even if we accept the mixed treatment of Prior’s disjunction—and
we needn’t—that would show that correct description is normatively relevant
only if correctness does some work toward explaining why we accept different
verdicts. Otherwise correctness might have nothing to do with normativity.
Other explanations are plausible: the mixed treatment of Prior’s disjunction is
tolerable because of what asserting it would commit us to at different worlds.
At worlds where we know that tea-drinking is common in England, we can
assert the disjunction while denying that New Zealanders ought to be shot.
But when we consider worlds where we know that tea-drinking is not common,
asserting the disjunction commits us to saying that all New Zealanders should,
in fact, be shot. Karmo’s relativity approach reflects the fact that at some
worlds we would be committed to obviously normative claims, and not at
others.
Notice there is no similar change in our commitments when we assert BILL
or BILL*. Whatever the world, saying that Bill was right to tell the truth
about Monica means that Bill ought to tell the truth about Monica. That’s
a reason for thinking at least some normative sentences stay that way across
worlds. And if they do, then KHG governs the wrong language and it too is a
poor candidate to be Hume’s Guillotine.
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6.4 Third strategy: fragility
Perhaps a different modal logic is the answer. Deontic logic is one where the
concepts of permission and obligation are defined like possibility and necessity
operators, but within a special set of morally satisfactory worlds. Roughly, a
sentence is permissible just when it’s true at at least one morally satisfactory
world, and a sentence is obligatory just when it’s true at all the morally
satisfactory worlds.
In a deontic system, the truth of ought-sentences is sensitive to changes to
the set of worlds that are morally satisfactory in a given model. Greg Restall
and Gillian Russell use this feature to dodge to Prior’s dilemma. Call it the
fragility approach. It calls a sentence is normative just in case there is at
least one model where replacements and additions to the set of satisfactory
worlds change its truth-value—that is, one model in which it’s fragile—and
descriptive just in case it isn’t sensitive to those replacements in every model
where it’s true, making it preserved.22 A sentence like ‘Lois ought to donate to
charity’ is normative on this approach because its truth does change with the
set of satisfactory worlds: if Lois donates at all the satisfactory worlds, and we
add a new satisfactory world to the model in which she doesn’t, the sentence
goes from true to false. Conversely, a sentence like ‘snow is white’ comes out
descriptive because it doesn’t matter what’s in the set of satisfactory worlds.
Since ‘snow is white’ is not a deontic modal claim, its truth-value doesn’t vary
with things happening at other possible worlds.
This approach is powerful enough that Restall and Russell don’t need
to state an alternative to Naïve HG. It’s left untouched by Prior’s
arguments because the crucial tea-drinking disjunction is neither normative
22Restall and Russell 2010, pp. 254-255.
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nor descriptive. It fails the test for normativity in any model where
tea-drinking is actually common in England because it will remain true no
matter what additions or replacements are made to the set of satisfactory
worlds, so it’s not fragile. If tea-drinking is actually scarce in England, then
it fails the test for being descriptive.The disjunction would be true only if all
New Zealanders are shot at every satisfactory world. Replacing one of these
worlds with one at which they are not shot makes the disjunction false, so
the disjunction is not preserved when true. Thus neither of Prior’s arguments
counts as an is-ought derivation.
Peter Vranas argues that the fragility approach mis-categorizes some
normative sentences, making the view extensionally inadequate.23 Consider:
(LC) Lois should donate to charity if she is able.
Vranas would say LC is equivalent to either Lois is unable to donate or she
ought to donate to charity, which is labelled as non-normative by the fragility
approach for the same reason as Prior’s disjunction: it’s not fragile in models
where Lois is unable to donate. Vranas believes that’s implausible.
This is the right line of argument to press against the fragility version of the
Guillotine, but it’s insufficient for present purposes. I’m suggesting that the
approach cannot generate an inference barrier relevant to the actual practice
of ethics. Vranas’s argument doesn’t show this for two reasons: (a) it fails to
establish that fragility approach really is inadequate, and (b) as we saw with
the wide term approach, inadequacy on its own may not lead to irrelevance.
More needs to be said.
The argument doesn’t show what it intends to because it says nothing
about the scope of the obligation operator in LC. This is crucial. If it has wide
23Vranas 2010, pp. 264-265.
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scope: □(Al ⇒ Dc), then the sentence is not equivalent to the non-normative
disjunction ¬Al ∨ □Dc. A wide-scoped LC would come out as normative
because in any model where it’s true, adding or replacing satisfactory worlds
can make the sentence false, making it fragile. Just add a world where some
people who are able to donate refuse. The fragility approach is inadequate
only if we can show that LC has narrow scope: Al ⇒ □Dc. Given LC’s
surface grammar, it’s not obvious which reading is correct.24 So rather than
beginning with a sentence of English and insisting on narrow scope, a different
strategy is needed.
I think the right approach is to start in the meta-language: take a
narrow-scoped formula of deontic logic like Al ⇒ □Dc. Then we ask if it
has any acceptable natural language translations that are normative.The most
straightforward is this:
(LC*) If Lois is able, she ought to donate to charity.
To the extent the original LC is normative—and it is—LC* is too. That’s why
the fragility Guillotine is inadequate.
But mis-categorizing doesn’t always guarantee irrelevance, so another step
is needed. Remember the telegraph laws that wound up governing internet
traffic. In that case, the wide term approach grouped non-normative sentences
in with the normative ones. The fragility approach does the opposite by
putting normative cases in with the non-normative, so it’s is not a situation
where all the sentences that need to be governed are within the scope of the
principle. This barrier fails to govern what it should, so it’s irrelevant, just as
Jackson’s version was for leaving out valid arguments that aren’t formally so.
24Some people, notably John Broome 1999, think that sentences like LC should always be
understood to have wide scope. I think that’s a non-starter, since narrow scoped imperatives
that look just like LC are easily derivable from ¬Al.
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6.5 Moore’s Law
The challenge Prior’s dilemma creates looks difficult to surmount. The term,
relativity, and fragility approaches each generate a true principle that avoids
the counterexamples, but every one is irrelevant to actual normative assertion.
This suggests there may be no candidate that is both true and adequate.
Others may prove additional candidates that look like the Guillotine, but
given the difficulties above we should be hesitant to accept them as the genuine
article without thorough scrutiny.
The general problem comes from attempting frame a philosophically
significant inference barrier around the distinction between normative and
descriptive sentences, which is difficult to pin down. Moore’s Law steers
clear of these problems because it’s a semantic barrier: no atomic normative
terms are synonymous with any atomic descriptive terms, either directly or by
substitution. I think Moore’s Law can both stand in for the Guillotine and
improve on it in an important way. I won’t argue for Moore’s Law, though I
do think the open question argument offers a good reason to accept it. What I
will try to show instead is that Moore’s Law can deliver a lot of the regulation
of ethics that Hume’s Guillotine promised.
Of course, Moore’s Law is not without its own critics. Some metaethical
naturalists think it shows very little. After all, ‘the morning star’ and ‘the
evening star’ have different meanings and are conceptually independent, but
co-refer all the same. So too could normative terms be undefinable by
descriptive terms, but refer to the same properties. But this is more a criticism
of what we can learn from Moore’s Law than it is an indictment of the principle
itself. The only view Moore’s Law rules out is analytic naturalism—‘goodness’
and ‘pleasure’ can’t mean the same thing, for instance. Those who aren’t
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analytic naturalists are free to accept Moore’s Law and everything it implies.
Which properties are identical, and thus which expressions are co-referring, is
another question entirely.
Some may doubt the principle’s suitability for other reasons. If we are
called upon to give a precise account of the distinction between normative and
descriptive terms, we risk making it a rule for the wrong game too. Recall,
though, that Hume’s Guillotine needs to be that careful only because of Prior’s
dilemma. Had Prior not backed it into a corner, the barrier could have stood
on a more rough and ready version of the distinction. I think the same is
true of Moore’s Law: provided there is no equivalent problem, it should to
be enough to specify a list of normative terms—like ‘ought’, ‘should’, ‘may’,
‘good’, ‘right’, and ‘wrong’—that contrast with descriptive ones and leave the
question of how to specify the difference between them for another day.
So is there an analogue of Prior’s dilemma to make trouble for Moore’s
Law? Creating one requires choosing a term and asking if it’s normative or
descriptive. If the moorean says it’s descriptive, then the objector shows that
it’s synonymous with a normative term. If it’s said to be normative, tho
objector shows it has the same meaning as a descriptive term.
At first glance it’s difficult to see how to get this started. To follow
Prior we would want to find something disjunctive that has both normative
and descriptive elements, like ’quick or wrong’. The trouble is that Moore’s
barrier is meant to govern atomic terms only, so disjunctive predicates look
beyond the scope of the Law. Things aren’t so simple, however. Predicate
abstraction in logic enables us to represent seemingly compound expressions
as atomic predicates of a more precise meta-language. Phrases like ‘x is quick
or x is wrong’ can be formalized into a unitary constant that takes x as its
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argument. That is, x satisfies the one-place predicate quick-or-wrong, which
we understand as Qx—an atomic term.
So far so good for the opponent of Moore’s Law, allowing that predicate
abstraction gives an adequate model for natural language. The next step would
be to show that our new single expression means the same as both normative
and descriptive terms, just as Prior’s tea-drinking disjunction participates in
valid implication with normative and descriptive sentences. Here is where the
analogy to Prior breaks down. What would the quick-or-wrong predicate be
synonymous with? I don’t believe it could be either ‘quick’ or ‘wrong’ on its
own, as each represents just a third of the complex. Failing those, no other
candidates present themselves. More generally, it’s difficult to imagine a clearly
normative or clearly descriptive term of natural language with a disjunctive
meaning comparable to ”quick-or-wrong” or anything like it. Sure, we could
introduce a new arbitrary term and stipulate that it has such a meaning, but
that won’t help because it creates a new object language. Moore’s Law governs
only natural languages. Creating a dilemma in an artificial one is irrelevant.
There may be a sense in which ‘quick’ and ‘wrong’ are partially synonymous
with the complex predicate. Each does capture part of the meaning. But this
won’t help either, since objecting that some normative terms are partially
synonymous with a descriptive term (or vice versa) would be like objecting
to Hume’s Guillotine by suggesting that some descriptive sentence partially
implies a normative conclusion because it could be used in an argument for
that conclusion. To get a genuine objection we need complete valid implication
and complete synonymy.
Prior had disjunctive syllogism and the rule of addition at his disposal,
which allowed him to piece together valid inferences with the tea-drinking
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sentence and its disjuncts. There is no equivalent way to break up a unitary
predicate since it has no proper parts to work with. The move that was needed
to state the dilemma prevents us from making it work. That’s a good reason
to think there is no analogue to Prior’s argument here.
With those worries out of the way, all that remains is to show why friends
of the Guillotine can accept Moore’s Law as a substitute. Many present-day
advocates should already accept Moore’s Law. Karmo’s relativity principle
assumes Moore’s Law because synonymy between normative and descriptive
sentences would make it impossible to vary the set of obviously normative
sentences while fixing the obviously descriptive sentences. Restall and Russell’s
fragility barrier also assumes the Law, since it treats descriptive terms as
predicates and normative terms as deontic operators. As a rule, atomic
predicative sentences imply deontic modal sentences only in certain models.
But if some normative terms had the same meaning as descriptive ones, then
some atomic sentences would imply deontic modals in every model, and that
can’t be. Pigden has also expressed support for Moore’s Law, though he thinks
the Guillotine doesn’t imply anything about it.25
Some who defend the Guillotine have an intrinsic interest in it because they
believe it’s an instance of the conservativeness of logic: you can’t get out what
you haven’t put in. But many more have been motivated by its ability to guide
ethics. I have my doubts about certain interpretations of conservativeness
because of cases like the Clark Kent D-argument, but if Moore’s Law can
regulate ethics in the other ways the Guillotine was meant to, this demand
can be met.
The Guillotine is employed primarily to explain why certain arguments
25Pigden 1989, p. 128.
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are invalid, like everyone does x, therefore x is permissible. Hume himself
appealed to the Guillotine to show that inferences like God favors x, therefore
x ought to be the case and x is human nature, therefore x is permissible are
invalid.26 But Moore’s Law can explain this too, even if Hume himself might
not have accepted it. These inferences are not formally valid, so if they were
it would likely be in virtue of meaning. But if Moore’s Law is true, there are
no normative-descriptive synonyms, so arguments like these fail because there
is no chain of substitution of synonyms for synonyms to license them. This
explanation improves on the one from the Guillotine. It preserves a sense in
which you can’t get an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, it does more than simply assert
that the inference can’t be made, and it avoids the problematic sentence-level
distinction.
This might seem too quick, though. Moore’s Law denies that normative
and descriptive terms mean the same, but failure of synonymy doesn’t always
result in an inference barrier. The word ‘uncle’ isn’t synonymous with ‘male’,
but the fact that Clark is an uncle validly implies that Clark is male. So
perhaps Moore’s principle can’t block the arguments that the Guillotine was
meant to after all.
While it’s true that some inferences cross gaps in meaning, there is
an important difference between the uncle-to-male argument and the ones
Hume had in mind. In the uncle-male case, synonymy does secure the
conclusion—not directly, but by substitution. To derive ‘Clark is male’ from
‘Clark is an uncle’ we replace ‘uncle’ with ‘father’s brother’, then ‘brother’
with ‘male sibling’, and we have the conclusion by simplification. The
human-nature-to-permissible argument (and others like it) cannot work this
26Hume 1739/1978, p. 469.
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way if Moore was right. If it did, there would have to come a point in the
substitution chain where a descriptive term was replaced with a normative one
on the basis of meaning. Moore’s Law says there is a divide that cannot be
bridged—the only terms that can stand in for ‘human nature’ are descriptive
ones, and the only ones that can stand in for ‘permissible’ are normative ones.
Others have relied on the Guillotine to argue that normative beliefs
cannot be deductively justified by descriptive beliefs, like Huemer and
Sinnott-Armstrong.27 Moore’s Law cannot show this of course, since beliefs
are propositional and Moore’s Law says nothing about sentence-level things.
This is for the best though, because the same problems that make trouble for
the inference barrier will afflict a barrier between normative and descriptive
beliefs. Yet Moore’s Law can show something similar: no beliefs featuring
normative terms can be justified by deduction from a set of premises lacking
normative terms by substitution of synonyms for synonyms. Moore’s barrier
shows that the chain of substitution cannot be completed.
Still others have tried to leverage the Guillotine to create an explanatory
advantage for moral non-cognitivism, the idea that normative assertions lack
truth-values.28 Non-cognitivists have an easy explanation of why Hume’s
Guillotine would be true—since normative sentences have no truth-values,
they cannot be implied by any sentences whatsoever—while cognitivists are
supposed to find it difficult to offer a competing explanation. I take no
stand on whether non-cognitivists would have such an advantage, but to the
extent that there would be one, Moore’s Law can be employed for the same
work. Non-cognitivists can instead explain the failure of synonymy between
sentences using normative and descriptive terms by appealing to the former’s
27Sinnott-Armstrong 2000; Huemer 2005.
28See Hare 1952 in particular, and many of the entries in Pigden, ed. 2010.
136
lack of truth-aptness, and claim as before that cognitivists cannot offer a
good competitor.
There may yet be a way to rescue Hume’s Guillotine from Prior’s dilemma,
but the current prospects are dim, since the troubles with normative and
descriptive sentences cast doubt on the enterprise of proving it. If what I’ve
argued about Moore’s Law is correct, then the heavy lifting needed to save
the Guillotine from the mire of problems that emerged above is unnecessary.
Giving it up involves little if any cost and affords at least one important
additional benefit. Devotees would therefore do better to focus on defending
and invoking Moore’s Law instead.
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